Background
A Douglas County jury convicted Franklin Frederick Miyamoto of second- and third-degree assault based on evidence that he strangled his ex-girlfriend. Miyamoto appealed, challenging two rulings made during jury selection and instructions.
During voir dire, two prospective jurors, S.D. and L.L., initially expressed views suggesting that a defendant’s presence in court meant there was some basis for guilt. After the trial court restated the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden, the court denied Miyamoto’s challenges for cause. Both jurors served.
The Court’s Holding
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to remove S.D. and L.L. for cause. Although their initial statements raised concerns requiring rehabilitation, the court explained the governing principles, neither juror objected, and the trial judge observed both jurors nodding in agreement. The appellate court deferred to those firsthand observations.
The court also rejected Miyamoto’s unpreserved challenge to the 2022 model reasonable-doubt instruction. Relying on the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Teran Sanchez v. People, the court held that the instruction, viewed as a whole, is constitutional and does not lower or shift the prosecution’s burden. It further agreed with prior appellate decisions that omission of “lack of evidence” and “hesitate to act” language did not make the instruction deficient.
Key Takeaways
- A prospective juror’s initial misunderstanding of the presumption of innocence can be cured through the court’s explanation and observed response.
- Appellate courts give substantial deference to trial judges’ credibility and demeanor findings during voir dire.
- Colorado’s 2022 model reasonable-doubt instruction remains constitutional despite challenges to its “real possibility” wording and omitted phrasing.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that juror rehabilitation may rest on group questioning and a trial court’s observations of jurors’ demeanor, not solely on individualized verbal assurances. Defense counsel should therefore seek further individual questioning when the record leaves doubt about a prospective juror’s ability to apply the presumption of innocence.
It also confirms continued appellate acceptance of the 2022 model reasonable-doubt instruction following Teran Sanchez, limiting challenges based on the instruction’s phrasing or its departure from earlier model language.