Background
Jessica Jo Roberson pleaded guilty to felony counts of theft and forgery. She had been charged with theft of $20,000–$100,000 and four counts of forgery, but pleaded guilty to one count of forgery (a $7,500 check forged on or about December 22, 2016) and one count of theft of $1,000–$20,000 in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts.
Roberson’s plea agreement stipulated to $21,450 in restitution for victim Lee Hagler, with “[a]dditional restitution” reserved. The agreement further stated that “[r]estitution and costs of prosecution as to all originally filed and pled counts will be as ordered by the [c]ourt.” The district court ordered restitution in the amount of $59,870.93, far exceeding the stipulated amount. Roberson appealed, arguing that the prosecution violated the restitution statute’s deadline and that the court had no authority to order restitution beyond the plea agreement’s limit.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed this court’s prior opinion vacating the restitution order and remanded for consideration of Roberson’s remaining issues. The Court of Appeals now addresses whether the prosecution’s failure to timely submit restitution information deprived the court of authority to order restitution, and whether the plea agreement limited the restitution amount.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution order on both issues. First, the court held that although the prosecution violated Colorado’s restitution statute by submitting restitution information 28 days after sentencing (when it should have submitted before the order of conviction or within 91 days if unavailable), any error was harmless. The trial court retained authority to order restitution because it had ordered restitution at the June 25, 2020 sentencing hearing with the amount reserved for later determination. Under C.R.S. § 18–1.3–603(1)(b), a court may order a defendant obligated to pay restitution while deferring the specific amount for determination within 91 days. Moreover, Roberson had over 400 days to review and challenge the restitution request, and the prosecution reduced its initial demand before the final order. Roberson identified no prejudice from the 28-day delay.
Second, the court held that Roberson’s plea agreement did not limit her restitution to $21,450. The agreement’s language contemplating “[a]dditional restitution” and its reference to “all originally filed and pled counts” demonstrated the parties’ intent to permit restitution beyond the stipulated amount. Because Roberson and the prosecution may strike a plea agreement extending restitution to dismissed counts—a permissible trade-off allowing the defendant to avoid trial and receive a reduced sentence—Roberson was bound by the agreement to make restitution for losses stemming from all original counts, including those dismissed. The restitution ordered ($59,870.93) was far less than Roberson’s maximum exposure under the original charges.
Key Takeaways
- A trial court retains authority to order restitution even when the prosecution misses the statutory deadline, provided the court ordered restitution at sentencing with the amount to be determined later.
- Violations of a prosecution’s restitution-filing deadline are reviewed for harmless error and will not automatically require vacatur if the court retained authority and the defendant suffered no prejudice.
- A plea agreement allowing restitution for “all originally filed and pled counts” with “additional restitution” reserved permits the court to order restitution beyond any stipulated amount and based on dismissed charges.
- A defendant who agrees to restitution for losses from uncharged or dismissed conduct receives the benefit of avoiding trial and receiving a reduced sentence and is bound by that agreement.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies a critical procedural issue affecting criminal defendants: trial courts need not automatically vacate restitution orders when prosecutors miss statutory filing deadlines. The court’s harmless-error approach means that even procedural violations by the prosecution do not guarantee relief unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice. This has significant practical consequences, as restitution orders often survive appellate scrutiny despite procedural irregularities.
The decision also reinforces that defendants are bound by plea-agreement language extending restitution obligations beyond stipulated amounts and to dismissed counts. Defendants and their counsel must carefully parse plea agreement language, particularly provisions regarding “additional” or “reserved” restitution, as such language can expose defendants to far greater restitution liability than a quick reading of the stipulated amount might suggest. The court emphasized an objective, reasonable-person standard for interpreting plea agreements, not the defendant’s subjective understanding, which limits defendants’ ability to escape unfavorable restitution provisions through post-hoc disputes over intent.