Background
Robert C. Schlitt killed a black bear outside the game management unit authorized by his hunting license. Schlitt, his brother, and a nearby camper removed the bear’s head, hide, and paws but did not field dress the carcass or harvest any meat. Schlitt did not tell the camper that he planned to return for the meat.
After Schlitt’s father contacted Colorado Parks and Wildlife to ask whether the meat also had to be collected, Schlitt and his brother returned and harvested sixty-two pounds of meat. Investigators later found signs that edible meat remained and had been scavenged. A jury convicted Schlitt of willful destruction of wildlife, hunting without a valid and proper license, illegal possession of wildlife, and waste of edible game wildlife.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals held, as a matter of first impression, that the willful-destruction statute focuses on the hunter’s intent when the wildlife is killed and only trophy parts are taken. The offense occurs if, at that time, the hunter has the conscious objective of leaving the carcass behind with no intent to return. A later return to harvest meat may bear on the hunter’s original intent, but it does not necessarily preclude conviction.
The evidence sufficiently supported a finding that Schlitt initially intended to abandon the carcass: he took only trophy parts despite having the knowledge and equipment to preserve the meat, left the bear without field dressing it, stated that he did not have to take meat, and returned only after learning of his father’s call to wildlife authorities. The court also rejected Schlitt’s variance, prosecutorial-misconduct, and cumulative-error grounds for reversal, although it deemed the prosecutor’s reference to a case-screening process obviously improper but not plain error given the overwhelming evidence and the context of the remark.
The court further held that Schlitt’s waste conviction had to merge into his illegal-possession conviction because waste was one of the predicate offenses submitted to the jury for illegal possession. It vacated the waste conviction, remanded for correction of the mittimus, and otherwise affirmed the judgment.
Key Takeaways
- A hunter may commit willful destruction by taking only trophy parts with the intent to abandon the carcass, even if the hunter later returns for some meat.
- The relevant intent exists, or does not exist, when the animal is taken and the trophy parts are removed; later conduct is evidence of that intent but is not dispositive.
- When illegal possession is predicated on multiple offenses proved to the jury, only one predicate offense must merge, and courts preserve as much of the jury’s verdict as legally possible.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies the mens rea required by Colorado’s willful-destruction statute and prevents a hunter from automatically avoiding liability by returning to a carcass after initially intending to abandon it. Prosecutors may prove that original intent through circumstantial evidence, including how the carcass was left, the hunter’s statements, and the circumstances prompting a later return.
The opinion also illustrates how merger operates when alternative predicate wildlife offenses support an illegal-possession conviction, while cautioning prosecutors that references to internal charging review, warrants, or other screening processes are improper.