Background
A jury convicted Kenneth Miles Ueding of second degree assault involving the use of bodily fluids. The district court adjudicated him a habitual criminal and imposed a twenty-four-year Department of Corrections sentence. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in 2021, and the mandate issued in April 2022.
After two unsuccessful postconviction motions in 2022 and 2024, Ueding filed another Crim. P. 35(c) motion in 2025. He principally argued that Plemmons v. People and a 2023 amendment to the assault statute represented a significant change in the law that should apply retroactively and reduce his felony conviction to misdemeanor third degree assault.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed the summary denial of Ueding’s motion. Even assuming a favorable significant change in law, Ueding could not seek retroactive relief under section 18-1-410(1)(f)(I) and Crim. P. 35(c)(1) because his conviction had already been affirmed on appeal before he sought that relief.
The court also held that the 2023 amendment did not apply. The General Assembly expressly made it applicable only to offenses committed on or after October 1, 2023, while Ueding’s offense predated that date. Any constitutional challenge to his conviction or the prior version of the statute was successive because it could have been raised on direct appeal or in his earlier postconviction motions.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant whose conviction is final cannot obtain retroactive postconviction relief based on ameliorative legislation under the significant-change-in-law provision.
- An amendment expressly limited to offenses committed on or after a stated date applies prospectively, even if it reduces a criminal penalty.
- Claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings are barred as successive.
Why It Matters
The decision applies Colorado’s finality rules to a defendant seeking the benefit of later, potentially more favorable criminal legislation. It underscores that the legislature’s stated effective-date provision controls and that postconviction motions cannot be used to relitigate claims that were available in earlier proceedings.