Background
On July 31, 2023, State Trooper Noah Blanchette observed Lisette Bouchard’s vehicle abruptly stop in the middle of Route 85 in Montville, forcing other vehicles to take evasive action. When Blanchette approached her, he detected the odor of alcohol, observed her slurred speech and glassy eyes, and noted her pupils were dilated. Bouchard initially denied consuming alcohol but later acknowledged being at a restaurant for dinner. She failed field sobriety tests and was arrested for operating a motor vehicle under the influence. During transport, she refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, stating “my husband is in the system.”
Blanchette prepared an A-44 form—the standard police report documenting DUI arrests and test refusals—and signed it on August 2, 2023, two business days after the arrest. The Department of Motor Vehicles received the form on August 8, 2023, six business days after the arrest. At an administrative hearing on September 15, 2023, Bouchard’s attorney objected to the A-44 form’s admission on three specific grounds: incomplete information in Section H, lack of specificity about how the refusal occurred, and a “hardware error” notation on the chemical test printout. The hearing officer overruled all objections and found probable cause for the arrest, that Bouchard was arrested, that she refused the test, and that she was operating the vehicle. Her license was suspended for 45 days and an ignition interlock device was ordered.
Seven months later, while briefing her appeal to Superior Court, Bouchard raised a fourth objection: that Trooper Blanchette violated Connecticut General Statutes § 14-227b(c), which requires police officers to transmit DUI reports to the department within three business days. She contended the A-44 form should never have been admitted because it arrived six business days after her arrest. The Commissioner argued this claim was unpreserved because she never raised it at the administrative hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of Bouchard’s appeal, holding that her transmittal-deadline claim was unpreserved and therefore not properly before either court. The court noted that Bouchard’s own counsel conceded at oral argument that the transmittal requirement claim was never raised at the September 15, 2023 administrative hearing. Connecticut appellate precedent consistently requires that parties distinctly raise claims at the administrative level to preserve them for appellate review; courts are not required to consider claims raised for the first time on appeal.
The court rejected Bouchard’s argument that this preservation requirement should be excused because the claim arose only after the hearing. The statutory requirement that police officers mail or transmit reports within three business days has existed for decades—since at least 1990—so the claim was “ripe” at the time of the hearing. The court emphasized that the preservation requirement exists to prevent “trial by ambush” and to provide fair notice to the agency and the opposing party. Had Bouchard objected on this ground at the hearing, the hearing officer could have continued the proceeding to secure the trooper’s testimony about the timing of transmission and could have made specific factual findings on that issue.
Even assuming the claim had been preserved, the court concluded the record would be inadequate for appellate review because the hearing officer never made any findings about when Blanchette actually transmitted the report—only that it was received six business days after arrest. The Superior Court cannot assume the fact-finder role on questions the administrative hearing officer never decided. Because the factual question of timely transmission was neither presented to nor decided by the hearing officer, review was impossible without additional proceedings that Bouchard never requested.
Key Takeaways
- Claims must be distinctly and specifically raised at the administrative hearing to preserve them for judicial review; merely objecting on different grounds does not preserve alternative theories.
- The preservation requirement applies even when a statute has long existed—Bouchard could not claim the transmittal requirement “arose” later; it was available as a basis for objection at the time of the hearing.
- Parties cannot use appellate briefs to ambush the agency and opposing counsel with new arguments; doing so denies both fair notice and opportunity to respond or present evidence.
- When a fact-intensive claim reaches appeal, the hearing officer’s findings (or lack thereof) are critical; courts will not make new factual determinations that the administrative agency did not address.
Why It Matters
This decision is important guidance for Connecticut attorneys handling administrative appeals in DUI license suspension cases. It reinforces that procedural preservation rules—particularly the requirement to distinctly raise claims at the agency level—are not mere formalities but essential safeguards against surprise and unfairness. Practitioners must ensure they raise all objections and challenges during the administrative hearing itself; waiting to surface new theories in an appellate brief will result in waiver, regardless of the merits of the underlying claim.
The decision also clarifies that the Connecticut General Statutes § 14-227b(c) requirement to transmit DUI reports within three business days is a longstanding statutory obligation, not a novel recent requirement. Defendants and their counsel have long had clear notice that this deadline matters and should be subject to scrutiny at the administrative stage. Courts will not overlook this procedural hurdle simply because a defendant discovers it late in the process. For agencies and prosecutors, the ruling confirms they are entitled to rely on the preservation requirement to prevent surprise challenges and to avoid having to defend cases on grounds never presented to the hearing officer.