Background
In late 2019, Wendy and Rudy Pizzoferrato applied to rent an apartment at the Mansions complex in Vernon, Connecticut, which maintained a strict no-pet policy. Wendy had two shih tzu emotional support dogs and a therapist’s certification that they relieved her anxiety symptoms. Mansions initially approved the accommodation request but, after noticing the therapist’s form referenced only a single dog, conditionally approved only one dog. Mansions’ director of operations then sent an email demanding that the therapist provide, among other things, references to scientific studies proving two dogs were superior to one, detailed session notes, and information about whether Wendy took both dogs to work daily. The Pizzoferratos, who had already given notice at their prior apartment, viewed the demands as a pretext to drive them away. The lease was ultimately cancelled and all payments were refunded.
The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities filed a housing discrimination action alleging the defendants constructively denied the Pizzoferratos’ request for a reasonable accommodation — permission to keep both emotional support dogs — in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-64c(a)(6). After a bench trial, the trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, finding that Wendy was “regarded as” having a mental disability within the meaning of § 46a-51(20) and that each dog was necessary for her equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling. The defendants appealed.
The Appellate Court reversed, holding that while “regarded as” status alone cannot support a reasonable-accommodation claim, the trial court had implicitly found Wendy also had a “record of” a disability — and then separately held that the plaintiffs failed to prove the second dog was “necessary” under the stricter “essential, not merely preferable” standard. Both sides petitioned for certification, and the Supreme Court granted cross-appeals on the two central questions.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s reversal of the judgment for the plaintiffs, but vacated the Appellate Court’s reasoning in two significant respects. First, the Court rejected the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the trial court had implicitly found that Wendy had a “record of” a mental disability. Reading the trial court’s memorandum of decision as a whole, the Supreme Court concluded the lower court unambiguously rested its disability finding solely on the “regarded as” prong of § 46a-51(20) — it used the therapist’s diagnosis not as an independent finding of a “record of” disability, but to explain why Mansions treated Wendy as disabled. Because a “record of” disability finding was an independent alternative ground rather than a subsidiary finding necessary to support the judgment, no such finding could be implied.
Second, and dispositive, the Commission itself conceded on appeal that a plaintiff who is only “regarded as” having a disability — as opposed to actually having one or having a “record of” one — cannot establish a failure-to-accommodate claim. The right to a reasonable accommodation under fair housing law attaches to persons with actual or documented disabilities; it does not extend to those who are merely perceived as disabled. Because the only disability finding in the record was the “regarded as” finding, the Pizzoferratos were not legally entitled to any accommodation, let alone a second emotional support dog.
Having resolved the case on the threshold disability question, the Court vacated the Appellate Court’s analysis of the legal standard for “necessity” under § 46a-64c(a)(6)(C)(ii), leaving that question for another day. The judgment affirming the defendants was upheld, but only on the narrower ground that the plaintiffs failed to prove Wendy had a qualifying disability for accommodation purposes.
Key Takeaways
- “Regarded as” disabled status under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(20) is insufficient, standing alone, to support a reasonable-accommodation claim under Connecticut’s fair housing statute; a plaintiff must establish an actual disability or a “record of” a disability to trigger the accommodation right.
- Courts will not imply an alternative subsidiary finding — here, a “record of” disability — unless that finding was necessary to support the judgment actually rendered; where a trial court addressed the alternative ground only to support the finding it did make, no implicit alternative holding exists.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court expressly declined to resolve the legal standard for what makes an accommodation “necessary” under § 46a-64c(a)(6)(C)(ii), leaving that issue open for future litigation.
- Landlords seeking additional documentation for a second emotional support animal where only one was identified in the original accommodation form must still tread carefully — the Court’s ruling turned entirely on the disability-status question and did not endorse the breadth or intrusiveness of Mansions’ documentation demands.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies a critical threshold issue in Connecticut fair housing law: the three-part definition of “mental disability” in § 46a-51(20) — actual disability, record of disability, or regarded as disabled — does not confer equal rights across all three categories. Tenants and applicants who pursue accommodation claims solely on a “regarded as” theory now face dismissal at the disability-prong stage, regardless of how a landlord handled their request. Housing advocates and litigants will need to build and preserve an evidentiary record establishing an actual or documented disability when seeking accommodations for emotional support animals.
At the same time, the Court’s deliberate decision to vacate the Appellate Court’s ruling on the “necessity” standard preserves uncertainty on a question of broad practical importance — how rigorously a tenant must prove that a specific accommodation is essential rather than merely beneficial. That question will inevitably return to Connecticut’s appellate courts, and today’s opinion signals the Supreme Court intends to address it on a cleaner record.