Background
Sheri Speer brought a quiet title action to quiet title to her property at 12 Lee Avenue in New London against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, trustee of a mortgage-backed securities trust. Speer’s original complaint alleged three counts: quiet title under Connecticut General Statutes § 47-31, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The trial court granted Deutsche Bank’s motion to strike the FDCPA count. Speer then filed a revised complaint containing only the quiet title count.
Deutsche Bank had released the mortgage in June 2019—more than two years before Speer commenced the action in October 2021. In its answer, Deutsche Bank disclaimed any interest in the property and moved for judgment and costs under § 47-31(e). The trial court granted the motion for judgment and later awarded Deutsche Bank $8,377.23 in attorney’s fees. Speer appealed, challenging the attorney’s fees award, the denial of her motion to amend the complaint, and the denial of her motion to substitute Select Portfolio Servicing as the defendant.
The Court’s Holding
The Connecticut Appellate Court held that § 47-31(e) does not expressly authorize a court to award attorney’s fees to a disclaiming defendant. The statute permits courts to tax “costs” in favor of a defendant who disclaims interest in the property, but “costs” is a term of art with a limited, well-defined meaning referring to statutory allowances (court fees, witness fees, etc.), not attorney’s fees. Recognizing that attorney’s fees awards constitute an exception to the American rule—which requires each party to bear its own litigation expenses absent a contractual or statutory exception—the court concluded that exceptions to the American rule must be narrowly construed. Because § 47-31(e) uses only the word “costs” without express language authorizing attorney’s fees, the court determined the statute does not permit such awards. The defendant’s arguments that the legislature’s 1887 usage of “costs” contemplated attorney’s fees were unpersuasive; if attorney’s fees were intended, the legislature would have used express language as it did in contemporaneous statutes governing other contexts.
The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Speer’s motion to amend her complaint. Although Connecticut generally favors amendments, the motion was untimely. It came after Deutsche Bank had sought judgment on the only remaining count and had disclaimed interest in the property. The obvious purpose of the amendment was to resurrect the CUTPA count that Speer had deliberately abandoned when she failed to replead it following the strike of the FDCPA count. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion at this late stage.
The court also affirmed the denial of Speer’s motion to substitute Select Portfolio Servicing as the defendant, since judgment had already entered on the quiet title count and no counts remained to be adjudicated. Substitution solely to pursue an abandoned claim was improper.
Key Takeaways
- Attorney’s fees cannot be awarded under § 47-31(e) quiet title statute despite discretionary “costs” language; the statute’s exception to the American rule is limited to statutory costs only.
- Courts must narrowly construe statutory exceptions to the American rule requiring each party to bear its own litigation costs absent clear legislative authorization.
- Motions to amend complaints filed after judgment is sought on the only remaining count and with obvious purpose to resurrect abandoned claims are properly denied as untimely.
- Motions to substitute parties cannot proceed after judgment has entered, particularly when the purpose is to revive previously abandoned claims.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Connecticut’s strict adherence to the American rule and clarifies that statutory exceptions permitting cost awards must be interpreted narrowly. Defendants in quiet title actions cannot expect to recover attorney’s fees under § 47-31(e) merely because the statute permits recovery of “costs.” The ruling impacts mortgage-related litigation, where defendants like bank trustees assert they hold no interest in mortgaged property. Speer also illustrates judicial gatekeeping against procedural abuse: courts will not permit plaintiffs to circumvent late-stage denials and adverse rulings by amending complaints or substituting parties after the operative phase of litigation has concluded.