Background
On December 22, 2011, Marvin Narcisse attacked seventy-seven-year-old Marjorie Meketa outside a store in Bridgeport, Connecticut — tackling her from behind, stabbing her in the face with a broken wine glass stem, and kicking and stomping her until two bystanders intervened. He was charged with attempt to commit murder, first-degree assault, and assault on an elderly victim. In April 2013, the trial court found Narcisse not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect under General Statutes § 53a-13, concluding that he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct due to a mental illness — assessed at that time as likely schizoaffective or bipolar disorder. He was committed to Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) for a maximum term not to exceed forty years.
Over the following decade, Narcisse exhibited a pattern of intermittent improvement and repeated regression. He had multiple physical altercations with patients and staff, periods of refusing psychotropic medications, withdrawal from prescribed treatment, threatening statements, and episodes of verbal aggression including waving a pen aggressively at a staff member. He was briefly approved for transfer to a lower-security unit but continued to struggle with impulse control, medication compliance, and treatment engagement. His diagnoses over this period consistently included some form of bipolar disorder and a personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic traits.
On February 6, 2024, Narcisse filed an application in Superior Court for discharge from the PSRB’s jurisdiction under § 17a-593(a). At a July 10, 2024 evidentiary hearing, three witnesses testified: Narcisse’s forensic psychologist Andrew Meisler, his addiction counselor Felix Rivera, and the state’s consulting forensic psychiatrist Paul Bryant. Bryant, who had worked with Narcisse’s treatment team weekly for four years, testified that Narcisse still carried diagnoses of unspecified bipolar disorder, other specified personality disorder with narcissistic and antisocial traits, and multiple substance use disorders in sustained remission. He described incidents of physical violence and verbal threats occurring as recently as six months before the hearing and opined that a stepped-down transition — not outright discharge — was the appropriate next move. The trial court denied the application on October 8, 2024, and Narcisse appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Narcisse’s discharge application. On the first claim — that the court’s finding of unspecified bipolar disorder was unsupported — the Appellate Court applied the clearly erroneous standard and concluded that the trial court had ample evidentiary basis to credit Bryant’s testimony over that of Narcisse’s expert, Meisler. The court noted that Narcisse had been consistently diagnosed with some form of bipolar disorder since at least 2013, that Bryant’s current diagnosis of unspecified bipolar disorder had remained stable for approximately seven years, and that the trial court, as fact-finder, was entitled to weigh competing expert opinions and resolve the conflict in favor of the state’s witness.
On the second claim — that Narcisse had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he no longer posed a danger to himself or others — the Appellate Court likewise found no clear error. The record contained evidence of ongoing physical violence, verbal aggression, medication noncompliance, poor insight into his mental illness, and a maladaptive pattern of withdrawing from treatment when he felt slighted. Bryant’s testimony, crediting Narcisse’s own statement that he was not using illicit substances at the time of the index offense, actually increased the court’s concern by shifting the risk calculus away from substance-induced behavior and toward the acquittee’s untreated psychiatric illness as the primary driver of the 2011 attack.
The court reiterated the statutory framework under § 17a-580(11) and § 17a-593(f): the acquittee bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is a “person who should be discharged” — defined as an acquittee whose psychiatric disabilities do not cause him to be a danger to himself or others. Narcisse failed to carry that burden, and the trial court’s primary concern for the protection of society supported its order dismissing the discharge application.
Key Takeaways
- Under Connecticut’s PSRB statutory scheme, an acquittee seeking discharge bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his psychiatric disabilities no longer render him a danger to himself or others; the court’s primary concern is protection of society.
- A trial court acting as fact-finder may credit one expert’s diagnosis over a competing expert’s, and an appellate court reviewing under the clearly erroneous standard will not substitute its judgment on credibility or weight of expert testimony.
- A long, consistent history of the same diagnosis across multiple evaluators — here, unspecified bipolar disorder documented for over seven years — can defeat a single expert’s contrary opinion, especially where the competing view relies on an alternative causation theory (drug use) that the record evidence undercuts.
- An acquittee’s own admission that he was not using illicit substances at the time of the index offense can cut against him at a discharge hearing by removing a mitigating explanation for the violent conduct and reattributing the risk to untreated mental illness.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the deferential standard appellate courts apply when reviewing PSRB discharge proceedings in Connecticut. Courts will not second-guess a trial court’s resolution of competing expert testimony about an acquittee’s current mental state and dangerousness, provided the record contains evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could credit. Defense attorneys representing acquittees in discharge proceedings should be aware that presenting a lone contrary expert opinion — without dismantling the longitudinal diagnostic record compiled by treating clinicians — is unlikely to overcome the state’s evidence, particularly where the acquittee’s behavioral history in the facility continues to show impulsivity, aggression, and medication noncompliance.
The case also highlights a strategic risk for acquittees who acknowledge sobriety at the time of the index offense. While such admissions may seem favorable to a narrative of rehabilitation, they can simultaneously undercut arguments that the original offense was substance-driven rather than a product of serious, ongoing psychiatric illness — potentially strengthening the state’s case for continued confinement.