Background
Christopher Porter was charged with first-degree robbery and first-degree murder in the death of Richard George, who died from blunt-force trauma and asphyxiation. Shortly before trial, the State disclosed that it intended to call two jailhouse informants, including Cary Green. Porter’s attorney, J’Aime Rau of the Office of Defense Services, had represented Green in another criminal matter.
Rau repeatedly told the Superior Court that her attorney-client relationship with Green had ended and that no conflict existed. Relying on those representations, the court allowed her to continue representing Porter. A jury convicted Porter of second-degree murder and first-degree robbery. After Porter appealed and asserted that he had not learned of counsel’s representation of Green until sentencing, further investigation showed that Rau had concurrently represented both men. Following a remand and evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court found that their interests became adverse when Green offered to testify against Porter and that Porter had never provided informed written consent to the conflict.
The Court’s Holding
The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with both Porter and the State that the concurrent-client conflict denied Porter a fair trial. The court relied on the Superior Court’s unchallenged findings that Rau represented Porter and Green simultaneously, that their interests were adverse, and that the conflict was imputed throughout ODS.
The court reversed Porter’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial with conflict-free representation. Although actual-conflict claims ordinarily are considered in postconviction proceedings, the court addressed the issue on direct appeal because the conflict was apparent from the developed record, the State agreed with the result, and delaying review would provide no benefit.
Key Takeaways
- A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to conflict-free representation.
- Concurrent representation became directly adverse when one client offered to testify against the other, and the conflict was imputed to ODS as a law firm.
- Because Porter did not give informed written consent and was denied a fair trial, the proper remedy was reversal and a new trial with conflict-free counsel.
Why It Matters
The order underscores the importance of accurately identifying concurrent-client conflicts before trial, particularly when a current client becomes a prosecution witness against another client. Counsel’s mistaken understanding of the representation and its imputation within ODS prevented Porter from making an intelligent waiver.
It also illustrates the limited circumstances in which the Delaware Supreme Court will resolve an ineffective-assistance or conflict claim on direct appeal rather than require separate postconviction proceedings: the material facts were established after remand, the deficiencies were apparent from the record, and the State agreed that a new trial was required.