Background
Bryant Phillips was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia of two counts of sexual abuse, kidnapping, two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, assault with significant bodily injury, and threats. The charges arose from a three-day period in June 2022 during which Phillips held his romantic partner, A.H., captive in his apartment while repeatedly physically and sexually assaulting her and forcing her to smoke crack cocaine. A.H. ultimately sought help when she returned to work, and hospital examinations confirmed multiple injuries consistent with her account.
At sentencing, the government invoked D.C. Code § 22-1804a(a)(2), which authorizes a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for repeat offenders who have committed two prior “crimes of violence.” The government cited Phillips’s 1994 armed robbery conviction and his 2013 federal murder-for-hire conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1958. Phillips did not challenge the enhancement at sentencing, and the trial court did not inquire whether Phillips affirmed or denied the prior convictions or warn him that any challenge not raised before sentencing would be forfeited — the procedure required by D.C. Code § 23-111(b). The court sentenced Phillips to life without parole.
Phillips appealed, raising three challenges to his convictions and two challenges to the sentencing enhancement.
The Court’s Holding
The DC Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Associate Judge Deahl, affirmed all of Phillips’s convictions. First, the court found no plain error in admitting A.H.’s testimony that Phillips had told her he previously murdered someone. Phillips had effectively conceded at the pretrial stage that A.H. could testify about this knowledge, and the testimony was relevant to A.H.’s state of mind — explaining why she did not flee when she had opportunities. Second, the court held that the trial court’s failure to repeat its limiting instruction in the final jury charge was not error, because the instruction was given when the testimony came in and defense counsel never requested its repetition. Third, the court upheld the denial of a mistrial motion after A.H. mentioned Phillips “was on house arrest” when they first met. The trial court struck the testimony immediately, and the brief reference was not so prejudicial as to deprive Phillips of a fair trial.
On the sentencing enhancement, however, the court agreed with Phillips that the trial court erred. Section 23-111(b) of the D.C. Code requires the sentencing court to ask the defendant whether he affirms or denies prior convictions used to enhance a sentence and to warn that any challenge not raised before sentencing is forfeited. The trial court conducted no such inquiry. The government argued the omission was harmless because Phillips never contested his convictions, but the court disagreed, explaining that the statutory inquiry requires more than a “yes or no” question — it must include the forfeiture warning so the defendant can make an informed decision about whether to challenge the classification of prior offenses.
The court remanded for resentencing proceedings where the § 23-111(b) inquiry must be conducted, leaving for the trial court to address Phillips’s argument that his federal murder-for-hire conviction does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under D.C. law.
Key Takeaways
- A trial court’s failure to conduct the mandatory § 23-111(b) inquiry before imposing a recidivist sentencing enhancement generally requires a remand for resentencing, particularly where the defendant raises a substantive challenge to the classification of a prior conviction on appeal.
- The § 23-111(b) inquiry is not merely a formality — it must include both a question about whether the defendant affirms or denies prior convictions and an explicit warning that unchallenged convictions cannot be disputed later. Omitting the warning violates the statute even if the defendant appears to accept the prior convictions.
- Testimony about a defendant’s prior violent acts may be admissible as state-of-mind evidence — to explain a victim’s behavior — rather than as propensity evidence, especially where the defense has effectively conceded the testimony’s admissibility during pretrial proceedings.
- Whether a federal murder-for-hire conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the D.C. recidivist statute remains an open question that the trial court must address on remand.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the procedural safeguards that D.C. law imposes before a defendant can receive an enhanced sentence as a repeat violent offender. The court made clear that § 23-111(b) is not a mere technicality — it serves the critical function of ensuring defendants have a meaningful opportunity to challenge the use of prior convictions before an enhanced sentence is imposed. For prosecutors, the case is a reminder to ensure trial courts complete the statutory colloquy in full, including the forfeiture warning, before any enhanced sentence is entered.
The decision also sets up a potentially significant question for remand: whether a federal murder-for-hire conviction qualifies as a D.C. “crime of violence.” Because the federal statute can be violated by conduct that may not involve actual violence — such as using interstate commerce facilities to commission a murder that is never carried out — the answer could affect how federal convictions are used in D.C. recidivist sentencing going forward.