Background
Metropolitan Police Department officers saw Marc Anthony Quarles walk past their parked cruiser. One officer believed that a rectangular shape beneath Quarles’s clothing was the outline of a handgun’s handle and magazine. The officers were not responding to a crime report, had no prior information about Quarles, and did not know whether he was licensed to carry a firearm.
After Quarles left a carry-out restaurant, two uniformed officers followed him, repeatedly called out “yo, my man, yo,” and closed in on him. Quarles then ran into an alley, where an officer tackled him. Police recovered a handgun, and Quarles was later convicted of several weapons offenses. The trial court denied his suppression motion, reasoning that the apparent gun and his flight supplied reasonable suspicion.
The Court’s Holding
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Quarles. In light of constitutional and legislative developments recognizing a right to carry handguns outside the home and providing a licensing regime in the District, possession of a handgun cannot, without more, be treated as presumptively unlawful. The record contained no particularized evidence that Quarles’s possession was illegal.
Quarles’s flight provided some grounds for suspicion, but its weight was significantly reduced by the context. He did not flee upon first seeing the police; he ran only after two officers followed him, repeatedly called to him, and closed in. He made no furtive movements toward his waistband, attempted no unusual evasive maneuvers, and was not linked to any reported crime or location-specific criminal activity. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the apparent handgun and contextualized flight did not establish reasonable suspicion.
Because the government did not dispute that the handgun should be suppressed if the stop was unconstitutional, the court vacated Quarles’s convictions and remanded for further proceedings.
Key Takeaways
- Mere possession of a handgun in the District of Columbia, without additional evidence suggesting illegality, does not create reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.
- Flight remains relevant, but courts must evaluate its significance in context, including whether police conduct could plausibly cause an innocent person to flee.
- Apparent firearm possession plus flight was insufficient here because officers had no crime report, suspicious gestures, concealment behavior, or other particularized indication of unlawful possession.
Why It Matters
The decision rejects older Fourth Amendment reasoning that treated handgun possession in the District as presumptively criminal. After changes in Second Amendment law and the District’s firearm-licensing framework, officers need some additional, particularized basis to suspect that a person’s possession is unlawful before conducting a stop.
The opinion also reinforces the D.C. Court of Appeals’ context-sensitive treatment of flight, including recognition that an approaching group of armed officers may cause apprehension—particularly for an African-American man—for reasons unrelated to consciousness of guilt.