Background
Atefeh Rokhvand and Hazami Barmada participated in demonstrations outside the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C., protesting Israel’s military actions in Gaza. During three encounters in March and May 2024, Rabbi Shmuel Herzfeld and others visited or passed the protest site, where the parties exchanged contentious political remarks. Rokhvand and Barmada testified that Herzfeld’s words, demeanor, and repeated presence left them frightened and feeling watched or harassed.
Rokhvand and Barmada petitioned for anti-stalking orders. After trial, the Superior Court found no qualifying threats, following, monitoring, or surveillance and denied the petitions. It later denied Herzfeld’s special motion to dismiss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act as moot but awarded him approximately $180,000 in attorney’s fees under that statute, alternatively finding that the petitions had been brought in bad faith.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the anti-stalking petitions. Viewed in the context of public political demonstrations, Herzfeld’s provocative and unpleasant comments were protected political rhetoric, not true threats conveying a serious intent to commit unlawful violence. Conduct by Herzfeld’s companions also did not establish the two or more qualifying occasions required for a course of conduct constituting stalking.
The court held that anti-stalking petitions are civil claims subject to the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act. It nevertheless vacated the fee award because the trial court did not apply the Act’s proper, summary-judgment-like standard: fees required a determination that the petitions were deficient as a matter of law, not merely that they failed after the court weighed evidence and credibility at trial. The alternative bad-faith rationale also could not stand because Rokhvand and Barmada had not received notice that bad-faith sanctions were under consideration or an adequate opportunity to respond.
Key Takeaways
- Harsh or offensive political rhetoric at a public demonstration is not a true threat unless, in context, it communicates a serious expression of intended unlawful violence.
- A petition for an anti-stalking order is a civil claim within the scope of the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act.
- Anti-SLAPP fees require application of the Act’s legal-sufficiency standard, while bad-faith sanctions require sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies the First Amendment boundary governing anti-stalking petitions arising from confrontations at political protests. A petitioner’s genuine fear does not by itself transform protected political rhetoric into a true threat under the objective constitutional standard.
The ruling also confirms that the Anti-SLAPP Act can reach expedited anti-stalking proceedings while emphasizing that a merits victory after trial does not automatically justify anti-SLAPP fees. On remand, the trial court may reconsider fees under the correct standards and procedures.