Background
Mr. Gökhan Acar was convicted on 20 June 2000 by the Konya Criminal Court of unlawful possession of a firearm and sentenced to a fine. On 21 October 2015, the same court granted his application for deletion of his conviction from his criminal record and restoration of his rights. However, data relating to his conviction continued to be stored in the GBT/KİHBİ database—a General Information Gathering system maintained by Turkey’s Ministry of the Interior pursuant to an unpublished administrative directive.
On 7 August 2019, Acar commenced administrative proceedings in the Konya Administrative Court, seeking deletion of his record from the database. He argued that the continued retention of his personal data lacked a proper legal basis under Turkish law, which requires statutory authorization for personal data processing under Article 20 of the Turkish Constitution. The administrative courts dismissed his claims, as did the Constitutional Court in October 2021.
Acar then applied to the European Court of Human Rights, contending that the continued storage of his conviction data in the police database, despite its removal from his official criminal record, violated his right to respect for his private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Court’s Holding
The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 8. It first rejected the Government’s preliminary objections, holding that the applicant qualified as a victim by mere storage of his personal data relating to criminal conviction—without need to show actual use of the information—and that storage of conviction data constitutes sufficiently serious interference to avoid characterization as merely an insignificant disadvantage.
On the merits, the Court held that the storage of Acar’s conviction data in the GBT/KİHBİ database was not “in accordance with the law” as required by Article 8(2). Although the Directive had a legal basis in Supplementary Section 7 of Law No. 2559, that statute conferred only vague authority and did not establish concrete principles or procedures for retention. More critically, the KİHBİ/GBT Directive itself was never officially published and therefore failed to meet the accessibility and foreseeability requirements established in the Court’s case-law. The Directive also lacked minimum safeguards against arbitrary exercise of discretion and did not provide adequate indication of the scope of authorities’ powers.
The Court awarded Acar EUR 2,000 in non-pecuniary damages and EUR 500 in costs and expenses.
Key Takeaways
- Mere storage of personal data relating to criminal convictions constitutes an interference with Article 8 privacy rights, regardless of whether the data is actually used.
- Executive directives and administrative rules cannot substitute for statutory authorization when a state’s constitution requires statutory basis for personal data processing.
- Domestic law governing personal data retention must be officially published and formulated with sufficient precision to enable individuals to understand the scope of authorities’ powers and safeguards available.
- Spent or deleted convictions warrant heightened protection; retention in police databases after official deletion creates ongoing interference with private life that must satisfy strict legal requirements.
Why It Matters
This judgment establishes important precedent protecting individuals whose criminal convictions have become spent or been formally deleted. It clarifies that the mere fact of ongoing data storage—even absent demonstrated practical consequences—constitutes a cognizable harm under Article 8. The ruling has significant implications for member states’ criminal record databases and police intelligence systems, requiring them to ground retention policies in accessible, published legislation rather than unpublished administrative directives.
The decision reinforces the principle that safeguards against state power over personal data cannot be delegated to invisible executive rules. It will likely spur national courts and parliaments across Europe to audit the legal basis and publication status of their criminal databases, particularly systems governing retention of data on spent convictions or deleted records.