Background
Bakur Kiguradze, a Georgian entrepreneur and academic, was convicted of espionage in 2011 and served time in prison before being declared a political prisoner by Parliament in December 2012 and released under an amnesty. Following a full retrial, he was acquitted of all charges in July 2018. In 2020, media reported that he had donated approximately GEL 50,000 to the ruling Georgian Dream party, prompting scrutiny from opposition figures. In that context, a sitting Member of Parliament, I.A., gave a televised interview in which he referred to Kiguradze and others who had been convicted of espionage and subsequently released as political prisoners, describing them as “political partners of Georgian Dream” — without mentioning the 2018 acquittal.
Kiguradze brought civil defamation proceedings in July 2020 against the MP and several media outlets, alleging that the statement falsely portrayed him as a convicted Russian spy. The MP sought discontinuation of the proceedings against him, invoking parliamentary immunity under Article 39 of the Georgian Constitution and section 5 of the Freedom of Speech and Expression Act 2004, which shield MPs from liability for statements made in the exercise of their parliamentary duties. The Tbilisi City Court discontinued the proceedings against the MP in October 2021, finding a clear link between his statement and his parliamentary functions. The Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld that ruling in January 2023 as a final decision.
Kiguradze then applied to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the discontinuation of the defamation proceedings deprived him of access to a court in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court examined the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1, applying the jura novit curia principle, notwithstanding that the applicant had initially framed his complaint under Articles 8 and 13.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth Section Chamber, sitting unanimously, held that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1. The Court confirmed that the interference with Kiguradze’s right of access to a court had a clear basis in Georgian law, pursued the legitimate aims of protecting free speech for elected representatives and maintaining the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary, and was not disproportionate to those aims. The Court reiterated that a rule of parliamentary immunity consistent with generally recognised principles across Council of Europe member states cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1.
Critically, the Court found that the application of parliamentary immunity in Georgia was not automatic. The domestic courts had conducted a genuine assessment — considering the context and content of the statement, the MP’s status, the Parliament’s own prior decree listing Kiguradze as a political prisoner, and relevant Supreme Court case-law — before concluding that there was a clear link between the statement and the MP’s parliamentary functions. The Court contrasted this with earlier cases such as Cordova v. Italy and Bakoyanni v. Greece, where no such meaningful nexus had been verified.
The Court further noted that the breadth of Georgia’s parliamentary immunity, which extends to statements made outside the Parliament building when in the exercise of parliamentary duties, is comparable to that found in several other Council of Europe member states. Bearing in mind the wide margin of appreciation afforded to states in regulating parliamentary immunity, the Court concluded that the limitation on Kiguradze’s right of access to a court did not impair the very essence of that right.
Key Takeaways
- Parliamentary immunity that bars defamation suits against MPs for statements made in the exercise of their duties does not automatically violate Article 6 § 1 — provided domestic courts genuinely verify that a clear link exists between the statement and the MP’s parliamentary functions, rather than applying immunity mechanically.
- Georgia’s constitutional immunity, which extends beyond the Parliament chamber to statements made in the exercise of parliamentary duties, falls within the range of immunity regimes accepted across Council of Europe member states and is not inherently disproportionate.
- The Court reaffirmed that states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in structuring parliamentary immunity, and that the absolute or broad nature of immunity is not in itself decisive to a proportionality finding — the key question is whether domestic courts engaged substantively with the connection between the expression and parliamentary activity.
- The Court applied the jura novit curia principle to reframe the complaint under Article 6 § 1 alone, declining to examine it under Articles 8 or 13 as originally pleaded.
Why It Matters
This judgment reinforces the ECtHR’s framework for evaluating parliamentary immunity claims under Article 6 § 1, most recently elaborated in Green v. the United Kingdom (April 2025). It confirms that broad immunity regimes — extending to statements made outside the chamber — can survive Convention scrutiny so long as national courts conduct a genuine, reasoned inquiry into whether the impugned statement is sufficiently connected to the MP’s parliamentary role. Courts that merely invoke immunity as a formality, without examining the functional nexus, risk falling foul of Article 6 as illustrated by the Italian and Greek cases distinguished here.
For practitioners in Council of Europe jurisdictions, the case underscores that individuals defamed by elected officials face a high threshold when challenging immunity-based dismissals: the complaint must show not merely that the statement was harmful or that the immunity is broad, but that the domestic courts failed to conduct the required nexus analysis. The decision also highlights the acute reputational stakes involved when political speech revisits prior criminal proceedings from which an individual has been acquitted — a tension the Court acknowledged but ultimately resolved in favour of parliamentary privilege.