Background
Adebayo Ademola, a Nigerian citizen and lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 1543 to willfully and knowingly using a forged or counterfeit Nigerian passport to open a bank account. Several years later, immigration authorities detained him when he returned from an international trip.
The Department of Homeland Security charged Ademola as inadmissible because his passport conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude. An immigration judge sustained the charge and ordered him removed to Nigeria, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Ademola petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review, arguing that an offense under § 1543 does not categorically involve moral turpitude.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. Applying independent statutory interpretation after the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, rather than deferring to the Board’s definition, the court concluded that crimes containing fraud as an ingredient are crimes involving moral turpitude.
Under the categorical approach, the court examined the minimum conduct punishable under the portion of § 1543 governing the knowing use of a false or invalid passport. It held that every form of conduct covered is inherently fraudulent or deceitful. Knowingly using a false, forged, counterfeit, mutilated, or altered passport is deceptive, and knowingly using a validly issued passport that has become void deceives both the issuing sovereign and the recipient. Section 1543 therefore categorically describes a crime involving moral turpitude.
Key Takeaways
- Knowing use of a false or invalid passport under 18 U.S.C. § 1543 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.
- After Loper Bright, the Fifth Circuit independently interpreted the statutory phrase rather than deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
- The categorical analysis turns on the minimum conduct required for conviction, not the particular facts of the noncitizen’s offense.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that a lawful permanent resident convicted under the passport-use provision of § 1543 may be treated as seeking admission after foreign travel and found inadmissible on moral-turpitude grounds.
It also illustrates that ending administrative deference does not necessarily change the outcome: independently construing the immigration statute, the Fifth Circuit reached the same categorical classification that prior precedent applying deference would have produced.