Background
Michael F. Burns owned Blue North Forest Products, a sawmill that purchased federal timber through an Integrated Resource Timber Contract (IRTC) with the U.S. Forest Service. Burns alleged that the Forest Service arbitrarily and capriciously exempted the IRTC format from the small business timber set-aside program, in violation of the Small Business Act, a 1971 Memorandum of Understanding between the SBA and Forest Service, and implementing regulations.
Burns and his operating manager challenged the Forest Service’s exemption decision through public hearings and meetings from 2010 to 2016. In 2016, Burns sold Blue North for $10,657,500, which he claimed would have been worth $35,000,000 had the IRTC not been exempted. He filed suit in September 2025 seeking $24,342,500 in compensation for the business’s loss in value.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the claim time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2501. This statute requires all claims be filed within six years after the claim first accrues. The court determined that Burns’s claim accrued either in 2010 when the Forest Service made the exemption decision or, at latest, in 2016 when he sold his business. Since Burns filed his complaint in September 2025—more than nine years after the earliest accrual date—the claim fell outside the six-year limitations period.
The court rejected Burns’s argument that the 2024 Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo (overruling Chevron deference) tolled or suspended the statute of limitations. The court held that Loper Bright did not create a new cause of action or ability to challenge agency action; it merely changed the standard of review courts apply to such challenges. Courts could challenge Forest Service decisions before Loper Bright; they simply afforded greater deference under Chevron. The court stated that the existence of unfavorable precedent does not suspend the statute of limitations, and plaintiffs must test their rights in available forums even if doing so would have been difficult.
Key Takeaways
- The six-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2501 is an absolute jurisdictional bar in Tucker Act cases and begins to run when all events fixing the government’s liability have occurred and the plaintiff knew or should have known of them.
- Changes in judicial review standards, such as Loper Bright’s overruling of Chevron deference, do not create new causes of action or suspend filing deadlines for existing claims.
- Unfavorable precedent does not excuse compliance with statutory limitations periods; plaintiffs must pursue their claims within the applicable timeframe despite legal obstacles.
Why It Matters
This decision provides important guidance for litigants challenging federal agency action under the Tucker Act. It clarifies that even when the law becomes more favorable to challengers—as it did with Loper Bright’s elimination of Chevron deference—plaintiffs cannot avoid statutory filing deadlines. The ruling reinforces that the six-year limitations period is jurisdictional and absolute, and that accrual occurs when harm manifests and is known or should be known, not when favorable legal precedent emerges.
For federal contractors and businesses harmed by agency decisions, the decision underscores the critical importance of promptly asserting claims in court rather than relying on future developments in administrative law. Even meritorious challenges to agency action will be barred if filed beyond the limitations period.