Background
While residing and working in the United Kingdom, Dr. Mark Charlton-Perkins applied for an assistant-professor position in the University of Cincinnati’s biology department. A faculty search committee voted three to one to recommend him. Its chair had previously advised Charlton-Perkins during his doctoral studies and coauthored publications with him, but a university administrator initially determined that relationship did not create a conflict of interest.
Faculty members outside the committee later raised concerns about the chair’s potential favoritism and about hiring Charlton-Perkins, a white man, rather than increasing the department’s gender diversity. Department head George Uetz and Dean Kenneth Petren initially discussed focusing on two female candidates. Petren ultimately canceled the search altogether, citing the perceived conflict, divided faculty support, gender considerations, and litigation risk. The position was never reposted.
Charlton-Perkins sued the University under Title IX and sued Petren and Uetz under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged equal-protection violations, seeking damages and an injunction placing him in the position. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The Court’s Holding
The Sixth Circuit held that Title IX did not protect Charlton-Perkins because the statute applies to a “person in the United States,” meaning a person physically present within United States territory. Charlton-Perkins was residing in the United Kingdom when Petren decided to cancel the search, when the cancellation was announced, and when Charlton-Perkins learned of it. His U.S. citizenship, earlier presence in Cincinnati for an interview, and application for a U.S.-based job did not satisfy the statute’s geographic requirement.
The court also held that sovereign immunity barred the official-capacity equal-protection claims. The requested instatement injunction would require Ohio to create and fund a position that no longer existed, directly burdening the state treasury rather than producing merely incidental costs. The majority also concluded that such relief lacked a sufficient analogue in the equitable or public-law remedies available at the Founding and therefore fell outside the Ex parte Young exception.
Finally, qualified immunity barred the individual-capacity claims. Charlton-Perkins identified no precedent clearly establishing that university administrators violate equal protection by canceling an entire hiring search under comparable circumstances. Given the perceived conflict of interest and concerns that proceeding might discriminate against either Charlton-Perkins or the female candidates, the court found that canceling the search was not so obviously unconstitutional that precedent was unnecessary.
Key Takeaways
- Title IX’s phrase “person in the United States” imposes a territorial requirement and does not encompass a U.S. citizen residing abroad when the alleged discrimination occurs.
- An injunction requiring a state university to create and fund a position is instatement, not reinstatement, and falls outside Ex parte Young when its primary effect is a direct burden on the state treasury.
- University officials received qualified immunity because no controlling or persuasive precedent placed the constitutionality of canceling this hiring search beyond debate.
Why It Matters
The published decision establishes in the Sixth Circuit that Title IX does not protect applicants who are outside U.S. territory at the relevant time, even if they are U.S. citizens, previously interviewed domestically, and seek employment in the United States. The court did not decide whether Title IX generally supplies a cause of action for employment discrimination or whether sex actually caused the University’s decision.
The ruling also draws a consequential sovereign-immunity distinction between reinstating someone to an existing state position and ordering a state institution to create and finance a new one. Judge Murphy separately concurred to flag—but not resolve—whether Title IX and employment-related equal-protection claims require proof of but-for causation rather than Title VII’s motivating-factor framework.