Background
Crystal Czerno sued General Electric in Massachusetts state court on behalf of her minor son C.L., alleging he developed leukemia after attending school near GE’s Pittsfield manufacturing plant. GE had manufactured and disposed of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) at the facility for decades, including during and after World War II. The complaint asserted strict liability, negligence, fraud, and nuisance claims arising from GE’s use, dumping, and disposal of PCBs in the Hill 78 landfill, located near Allendale Elementary School where C.L. attended.
GE removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that its wartime manufacture of specialized PCB-infused electrical components for military use established federal jurisdiction. The district court remanded the case to state court, concluding GE failed to satisfy the statute’s requirements. GE appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The First Circuit reversed and held that GE satisfied the “acting under” and “for or relating to” elements of the federal officer removal statute. The court rejected the district court’s imposition of a “strict control” requirement, finding it inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Instead, the court adopted a broad interpretation of “acting under,” holding that GE acted under federal officers’ authority by manufacturing specialized PCB-infused electrical transformers and capacitors at the government’s request during WWII and thereafter. The court emphasized that GE produced these customized products to meet specific military needs, dedicated its Pittsfield plant’s facilities to government contracts, and produced items the government would have had to manufacture itself.
The court further held that Czerno’s claims readily satisfy the “for or relating to” element. Following Congress’s 2011 amendment broadening this requirement, the statute no longer requires a causation link between the charged conduct and federally-directed work. The allegations concerning GE’s use, disposal, and dumping of PCBs constitute conduct “relating to” GE’s work under federal officers. The court did not reach GE’s alternative theory based on its remediation work under an EPA consent decree.
Key Takeaways
- Military contractors are the “archetypal case” of entities “acting under” federal officers for removal purposes, and the “acting under” requirement does not demand “strict control” by the government.
- A private contractor satisfies the “acting under” element when it manufactures specialized products for the government at the government’s request to meet governmental needs—even if the government lacks detailed regulation or supervision.
- The “for or relating to” element sweeps broadly following the 2011 amendment and does not require that the defendant was “acting under” a federal officer in taking the specific actions challenged in the suit.
- Courts must distinguish between the “acting under” element (concerning the relationship between the removing party and the government) and the “for or relating to” element (concerning the relationship between the complaint allegations and work done under federal authority).
Why It Matters
This decision significantly expands federal jurisdiction over state-court litigation involving defense contractors. By rejecting a “strict control” test and adopting a broad “acting under” standard, the court makes it easier for contractors who supplied specialized products to the military—even decades ago—to remove state-court environmental and tort claims to federal court. The ruling is particularly significant for historical claims: GE’s WWII-era defense contracts, combined with its wartime dedication of facilities and manufacturing of customized military products, sufficed to establish federal jurisdiction despite the environmental and personal-injury claims arising from peacetime PCB disposal practices.
The decision also clarifies that the “for or relating to” nexus requirement, broadened by Congress in 2011, allows removal of claims having only a loose connection to federally-directed work. Together, these holdings expand the availability of federal forum for contractors facing toxic tort and environmental damage claims tied to historical defense manufacturing, and affirm that federal officer removal is not confined to cases where the government explicitly directed the challenged conduct.