Background
Under federal immigration law, noncitizens subject to removal orders—including expedited removal orders, final administrative removal orders (FAROs), and reinstatement orders—may seek “withholding-only” relief: either withholding of removal (if they face persecution on protected grounds) or relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) if torture is likely. Petitions for review of removal orders must be filed within 30 days of the final order. Historically, all circuits held that this deadline did not run until withholding proceedings concluded, allowing noncitizens time to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.
In June 2025, the Supreme Court decided Riley v. Bondi, holding that the 30-day deadline runs from the date the removal order becomes final—even if withholding proceedings remain pending. The Court acknowledged this created “legitimate practical concerns” but suggested petitioners could file placeholder petitions for review. Riley also held that the deadline is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling. Following Riley, the Seventh Circuit received over a dozen petitions filed within 30 days after Riley was decided but more than 30 days after the original removal orders. Two petitions became lead cases: E.E.V., a Salvadoran national with a pending reinstatement order and withholding proceedings; and M.C.C.-G., a Mexican national whose reasonable-fear determination was pending when she filed.
The government moved to dismiss both petitions as untimely under the 30-day rule. It also advanced two new jurisdictional arguments: that reinstatement orders are not reviewable as final orders of removal, and that the petitions were filed too early—inconsistent with its primary position.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Circuit rejected all of the government’s motions. First, the court held that equitable tolling applies when the Supreme Court changes the law governing a procedural deadline. Because Riley fundamentally altered when the 30-day clock starts, noncitizens whose withholding proceedings were pending on the date Riley was decided are entitled to equitable tolling, allowing them to file within 30 days after Riley rather than 30 days after their removal orders.
Second, the court rejected the government’s argument that reinstatement orders are not final orders of removal subject to judicial review. The court held that reinstatement orders plainly fit the statutory definition: they are orders concluding that a noncitizen is “removable” and directing removal. The court emphasized that all eleven federal circuits have recognized judicial review of reinstatement orders, and that denying review would foreclose judicial scrutiny of identity, the existence of the prior order, illegal reentry, and even wrongful deportation of U.S. citizens—an “breathtaking” executive power inconsistent with constitutional limits and the meaning of citizenship.
Third, the court rejected the government’s argument that petitions filed within 30 days of Riley but before the administrative clock ran out were premature, finding this position irreconcilable with the government’s primary argument and contrary to Riley’s own framework, which contemplates placeholder petitions filed while withholding proceedings remain pending.
Key Takeaways
- Equitable tolling applies when a Supreme Court decision materially changes the law governing a procedural deadline, even if relief was not sought before the deadline under the old rule.
- Reinstatement orders—orders directing removal of a noncitizen who illegally reentered after prior removal—are final orders of removal subject to judicial review, despite the government’s new contrary position.
- The zipper clause in immigration law allows consolidated review of removal orders and withholding-only relief challenges in a single petition for review.
- Executive power to remove noncitizens is not unlimited; U.S. citizens wrongfully deported cannot be banished without any access to judicial review of identity and nationality claims.
Why It Matters
This decision protects access to federal judicial review for a potentially large class of noncitizens affected by Riley’s change in law. Before Riley, noncitizens could wait for administrative exhaustion; Riley compressed that timeline. This ruling recognizes the practical inequity of enforcing strict deadlines when the controlling law changed mid-stream and allows petitioners to respond to Riley without losing judicial review entirely.
The holding also settles—at least in the Seventh Circuit—that reinstatement orders are reviewable, preventing a gap in judicial oversight where the executive branch could deport someone based on a reinstated order with no court ever reviewing whether the person is actually the intended subject, whether they truly reentered illegally, or even whether they are a U.S. citizen. That principle implicates constitutional liberty and citizenship interests that transcend immigration procedure.