Background
Karima Javanzad worked as a sales associate at Appliance Factory’s Thornton, Colorado, store from February 2019 until her termination on June 10, 2020. In March 2020, she developed symptoms consistent with COVID-19, including coughing, shortness of breath, chest pain, and difficulty walking. She received twelve weeks of FMLA leave, scheduled to expire June 8. Although she briefly reported improvement in April, she later described renewed weakness, continuing illness, stomach pain, and an upcoming endoscopy. Her doctor recommended that she remain off work until her symptoms improved and she received the results of her planned procedures.
As her FMLA leave neared expiration, Javanzad repeatedly asked human resources specialist Sherry Coudayre about additional leave. During a disputed five-minute June 2 telephone call, supported by phone records and Javanzad’s testimony, she said she needed extra time because of stomach pain and difficulty breathing and speaking. She indicated that she might return a few weeks after the endoscopy, once her doctor identified the cause and proper treatment. Appliance Factory nevertheless insisted on a telephone conversation, did not answer her subsequent email inquiries about leave options, and terminated her after she did not return on June 8. Its termination letter acknowledged her request for additional time for a “gastrointestinal disorder.” An endoscopy later confirmed gastritis, and her symptoms improved within weeks of consistent treatment.
The EEOC sued, alleging failure to accommodate, disability-based discharge, and retaliation for requesting an accommodation. The District of Colorado granted Appliance Factory summary judgment on all claims. It did not decide whether Javanzad had an ADA disability, instead finding inadequate notice and no plausibly reasonable accommodation request, and resolved the other claims “for the same reasons.”
The Court’s Holding
Reviewing summary judgment de novo and drawing reasonable inferences for the EEOC, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded all three claims. It held that a reasonable jury could find Appliance Factory had notice of Javanzad’s disabling condition. Her connected reports of recurring symptoms, physician-imposed work restrictions, June 2 statements, and the termination letter’s recognition of a gastrointestinal disorder went beyond generalized complaints of feeling unwell. Neither a formal diagnosis nor the condition’s specific name was required. Her unemployment-benefits statement that she was not disabled could not establish the employer’s lack of contemporaneous knowledge, and credibility questions were inappropriate at summary judgment.
The court also held, while calling the question close, that a jury could find Javanzad adequately connected her leave request to her condition and supplied an anticipated duration of impairment: a few weeks after her endoscopy and resulting treatment. That estimate distinguished her request from indefinite leave. The court declined to decide whether she actually had a qualifying ADA disability, remanding that issue and the related unresolved expert-exclusion motions for initial district-court consideration. It rejected arguments that the EEOC had forfeited reliance on the June 2 call or judicially admitted that no call occurred, and confirmed that the disparate-treatment and retaliation claims remained on appeal.
Judge Matheson concurred in the notice and disability-connection rulings but dissented on reasonable accommodation. He concluded that “might need” and “probably” a few weeks were speculative and did not communicate an expected duration of impairment.
Key Takeaways
- ADA notice is contextual; a diagnosis or the word “disabled” is not indispensable.
- An estimated recovery period tied to testing and treatment may create a jury question even without a definite impairment end-date.
- The decision reverses summary judgment; it does not establish liability or decide whether Javanzad was legally disabled.
Why It Matters
The opinion requires employers and courts to assess leave requests through the employee’s cumulative communications, particularly for episodic or chronic conditions. It also narrows the distinction between leave duration and impairment duration: a concrete, medically grounded estimate may suffice even when future testing could change the prognosis.
At the same time, the partial dissent highlights the fact-specific nature of that inquiry. Employers retain the argument that genuinely open-ended leave is unreasonable, while employees must provide enough information to permit an assessment of when they may resume essential job functions.