Background
Susan Flaherty suffered severe injuries to her lower body and foot during a May 2019 scuba diving excursion in Belize when an employee of Amigos Del Mar—who was not a certified dive master—pushed her off a boat owned and operated by the company. As she entered the water, the vessel’s propellers pulled her under, causing serious mutilation to her foot, ankle, and knee. Flaherty filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in August 2020, asserting maritime law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. She properly served Amigos, a Belizean corporation, pursuant to the Hague Service Convention, with the company’s director signing the proof of service indicating voluntary receipt.
Amigos never appeared in the Massachusetts action. The district court entered a default judgment against Amigos on June 21, 2021, and held an evidentiary hearing on damages in October 2021—again without Amigos’ participation. On February 23, 2022, the court entered an amended judgment awarding Flaherty and her family over six million dollars in damages plus interest. Flaherty subsequently attempted to enforce the judgment in Belize beginning in July 2022, where she obtained a default judgment against Amigos in January 2023 and an enforcement order for over seven million dollars in September 2023. It was not until February 27, 2024—nearly two years after the Massachusetts judgment and nineteen months after enforcement efforts in Belize—that Amigos first appeared in U.S. court to seek relief.
The Court’s Holding
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of Amigos’ motion to vacate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), holding that the motion was barred by Rule 60(c)(1)’s requirement that such motions be filed “within a reasonable time.” Although the First Circuit had previously permitted Rule 60(b)(4) motions at any time, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton (decided during the pendency of this appeal) established that Rule 60(b)(4) motions must comply with the reasonable time requirement.
The court rejected Amigos’ argument that its two-year delay was reasonable. Amigos claimed that Belizean counsel had advised it that U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction, but the court found this justification insufficient. The district court had provided notice of its jurisdictional finding and the default judgment to Amigos before holding the damages hearing, and Amigos had expressly waived any challenge to the adequacy of service. The court noted that disagreement with a federal court’s jurisdiction finding provides no license to ignore the judgment and delay seeking relief for years. Even measuring the delay from Flaherty’s attempted enforcement in Belize (the most favorable timeline for Amigos), the nineteen-month delay before appearing in U.S. court was unreasonable and unjustified.
The court also addressed the prejudice analysis under Rule 60(c)(1), noting that while Flaherty argued she would suffer prejudice due to missing evidence, prejudice to the non-moving party is only one factor in the analysis and not the controlling consideration. Because Amigos failed to provide meaningful justification for its delay, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion untimely.
Key Takeaways
- Rule 60(b)(4) motions to vacate default judgments must now be filed within a reasonable time under Rule 60(c)(1), overruling prior First Circuit precedent permitting such motions at any time.
- A delay of approximately two years between entry of a default judgment and filing a motion to vacate is presumptively unreasonable, and a defendant’s dispute over jurisdiction does not justify ignoring a federal court’s judgment.
- Defendants who are properly served and notified of a default judgment cannot delay challenging it for years based on counsel’s jurisdictional theories; they must appear promptly to contest the court’s authority.
- When determining whether a Rule 60(b) motion was timely, courts consider the length of delay, justification for it, and prejudice, but lack of meaningful justification for delay is itself fatal to an untimeliness claim.
Why It Matters
This decision applies the Supreme Court’s newly established requirement that Rule 60(b)(4) motions comply with Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable time requirement, fundamentally changing the landscape for litigants seeking to vacate void judgments years after entry. Defendants can no longer rely on indefinite opportunities to challenge default judgments on jurisdictional grounds; they must act promptly upon being served and notified of a judgment, even if they dispute the court’s authority.
The decision has significant practical implications for maritime defendants and others subject to default judgments who wish to contest lack of jurisdiction. It reinforces that Rule 60(b)(4) relief, though available for void judgments, is not a license to sleep on rights. The opinion clarifies that the clock for assessing timeliness runs from entry of judgment, and even alternative timing approaches (such as measuring from enforcement attempts) will not save unreasonably delayed motions. Practitioners representing defendants in federal court must now advise clients to challenge jurisdictional defects immediately upon service, not months or years later.