Background
G.T. initially sued James and Susan McLaurie in Missouri state court in May 2023, alleging physical and sexual abuse she suffered while in their care at ages 3–4. Following a bench trial, G.T. obtained a judgment of $150 million against each defendant. In January 2025, G.T. filed a second state court action against the McLauries and Liberty Mutual, their homeowner’s insurer, seeking to collect on the prior judgment through claims of equitable garnishment against all parties and claims of bad faith, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against Liberty Mutual.
Liberty Mutual removed the case to federal court on January 31, 2025, invoking diversity of citizenship. James McLaurie subsequently entered his appearance on February 21, 2025. On March 11, G.T. moved to remand, arguing lack of diversity. On March 13, James McLaurie—rather than joining Liberty Mutual’s removal notice—joined G.T.’s remand motion, contending that the parties were not diverse.
The district court denied G.T.’s remand motion but granted James McLaurie’s motion, reasoning that McLaurie’s decision to join the remand motion signified a lack of unanimity among defendants. The court found this lack of unanimity rendered the removal defective under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), which requires that all defendants must join in or consent to removal. Liberty Mutual appealed, arguing the remand was improper.
The Court’s Holding
The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), orders remanding cases to state court are generally unreviewable when based on grounds specified in § 1447(c)—namely, a “defect in removal procedure” or “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” The court held that lack of unanimity among defendants constitutes a defect in removal procedure under § 1447(c), since 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) explicitly requires unanimous consent to removal.
Applying the “colorable” standard established in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (2007), the court held that the critical question is not whether the district court correctly applied § 1447(c), but whether the remand order is “colorably” based on § 1447(c). The court explained that review focuses on the district court’s subjective intent—whether it “believed” it was remanding based on a defect in removal procedure—rather than the objective accuracy of its reasoning. Liberty Mutual’s arguments that the district court misapplied the law or mischaracterized James McLaurie’s status only challenged the objective accuracy of the analysis, not the district court’s subjective intent.
The court rejected Liberty Mutual’s assertion that § 1448 (which grants later-served defendants the right to move for remand) provided a different legal ground that fell outside § 1447(c). The court noted that other circuits have held remand orders based on § 1448 to be colorably based on defects in removal, and that regardless of whether the district court’s reasoning was correct, it clearly “believed” it was remanding based on a defect in removal procedure. Therefore, review was barred by § 1447(d).
Key Takeaways
- Remand orders are generally unreviewable on appeal when based on defects in removal procedure or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- The standard for appellate jurisdiction is whether a remand is “colorably” based on § 1447(c), not whether the district court’s reasoning was legally sound or correctly applied.
- Lack of unanimity among defendants regarding removal constitutes a defect in removal procedure under § 1447(c).
- Appellate courts focus on the district court’s subjective intent, not the objective correctness of its legal analysis, when determining whether a remand is barred from review.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces a foundational principle of federal removal jurisdiction: once a case is remanded to state court, the finality of that decision is strongly protected. Congress deliberately restricted appellate review of remand orders to prevent protracted litigation over forum choice and to give district courts final authority on removal questions. The Eighth Circuit’s application of the “colorable” standard—focusing on subjective intent rather than objective correctness—ensures that parties cannot circumvent § 1447(d)’s bar through technical arguments about the district court’s reasoning or legal characterization.
The decision has practical significance for removal practice. Defendants seeking to remove cases must ensure unanimous consent among all properly joined and served defendants. A later-served defendant’s decision to remand—whether framed under § 1446(b)(2)(A)’s unanimity requirement or § 1448’s right to move for remand—can effectively veto the removal and return the case to state court, with no appellate recourse available to removing defendants who disagree with the remand.