Godson — D.C. Circuit dismissed untimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction

Case
Evangelistic Godson v. Johns Hopkins Medicine and Patrick Walsh, Dr.
Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Judge
Katsas; Walker; Garcia
Date Decided
August 21, 2026
Docket No.
25-7011
Topics
Appellate Jurisdiction; Untimely Appeal; Pro Se Litigants; Rule 4
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Evangelistic Godson sued The Johns Hopkins Hospital, which he named as Johns Hopkins Medicine, and Dr. Patrick Walsh, alleging mistreatment during a medical appointment. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction on December 4, 2024.

Godson filed a pro se notice of appeal on January 10, 2025, seven days after the 30-day deadline. His filing challenged the district court’s handling of the case and stated that he had learned of the dismissal while in Washington, D.C., for the remembrance of President Jimmy Carter. The appellees moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely.

The Court’s Holding

The D.C. Circuit held that a pro se notice of appeal should also be construed as a motion to extend or reopen the appeal period under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6) when it can reasonably be read as recognizing that the appeal is late, explaining the lateness, and requesting relief from the deadline. The court reviews de novo whether a district court should have construed a pro se notice in that manner.

Applying that standard, the court held that Godson’s filing could not reasonably be read as requesting an extension or reopening. Although it mentioned when he learned of the dismissal, that statement was buried among wide-ranging grievances and, in context, supported his broader claims of injustice rather than a request for relief from the filing deadline. Because his notice was untimely and no exception applied, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Judge Katsas concurred in the judgments. He agreed that Godson had not requested deadline relief, but questioned the majority’s broader reasoning that merely stating when an appellant received an order may implicitly request an extension or reopening. In his view, factual assertions may support a motion but do not themselves ask a court to act.

Key Takeaways

  • A late pro se notice of appeal may function as a Rule 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6) motion if it reasonably conveys awareness of the delay, the reason for it, and a request for additional time.
  • Godson’s reference to learning of the judgment after its entry did not, in the context of his filing, reasonably communicate a request to extend or reopen the appeal period.
  • Judge Katsas agreed with the disposition but disputed the majority’s suggestion that listing the date of receipt alone can implicitly request deadline relief.

Why It Matters

The decision explains how courts in the D.C. Circuit should evaluate whether an untimely pro se notice of appeal also serves as the motion required for relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6). Liberal construction does not eliminate the need for a filing to reasonably request relief from the jurisdictional deadline.

For practitioners assisting pro se appellants, the opinion underscores the importance of expressly acknowledging untimeliness, explaining its cause, and asking the district court to extend or reopen the appeal period.

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