Grant v. Amazon.com — Fifth Circuit affirms dismissal of employee’s multiple age discrimination and wage claims as barred by res judicata and state law preemption

Case
Grant v. Amazon.com Services, L.L.C.
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Judge
Wiener (George H. W. Bush, 1990); Willett (Donald Trump, 2017); Wilson (Donald J. Trump, 2020)
Date Decided
June 25, 2026
Docket No.
25-10865
Topics
Age discrimination, res judicata, employment law preemption, statute of limitations
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Reginald Grant worked at an Amazon fulfillment center in Texas from October 2018 until his resignation in August 2022. In 2020, he filed an EEOC charge alleging age discrimination, and after the EEOC declined to investigate, Grant filed his first federal lawsuit in 2021 (Grant I) claiming denial of promotions, overtime work, and delayed commercial driver’s license training under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). That case was dismissed on summary judgment, and his appeal was dismissed as frivolous.

Simultaneously, Grant filed a second lawsuit in Texas state court (Grant II) alleging breach of contract and fraud over Amazon’s alleged failure to pay him a 60-cent per hour shift differential. A jury initially awarded him $386; on appeal, a second jury awarded $20,000, but the Texas Court of Appeals reduced the award to $945.51.

While those appeals were pending, Grant filed the current lawsuit in July 2024 in state court, renewing his ADEA and wage-related claims and adding new claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), defamation, and “loss of use/loss of enjoyment.” Amazon moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the district court granted the motion, dismissing all claims with prejudice and denying Grant leave to amend.

The Court’s Holding

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Grant’s ADEA, breach of contract, and fraud claims were barred by res judicata—the doctrine preventing relitigation of claims already decided or that could have been raised in prior suits. All four res judicata elements were satisfied: identical parties, final judgment on the merits by a competent court, and claims arising from the same nucleus of operative facts as those in Grant I and Grant II. The court emphasized that res judicata bars not only claims advanced in previous proceedings, but also those that “could have been advanced.”

As to Grant’s remaining claims, the court held that his IIED and defamation claims were preempted by Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code, which provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination claims and preempts overlapping common-law causes of action. Additionally, the defamation claim was independently barred by Texas’s one-year statute of limitations, as Grant alleged defamation occurring in August 2022 but did not file suit until July 2024. The court also held that Grant’s “loss of use” and “loss of enjoyment” claims were not cognizable under Texas law—these are merely measures of damages, not standalone causes of action.

Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend, finding no abuse of discretion. Grant waited eight months after filing and three months after Amazon moved for dismissal before seeking to amend, offered no explanation for the delay, proposed no new allegations, and his claims were plainly barred by res judicata and state law such that amendment could not cure the defects.

Key Takeaways

  • Res judicata prevents relitigation of claims that arise from the same nucleus of operative facts as prior suits, even if the litigant attempts to reframe or repackage the allegations differently.
  • State employment discrimination statutes can preempt common-law claims like IIED and defamation when those claims overlap with employment discrimination allegations.
  • Defamation claims are subject to strict statutes of limitations; a delay of nearly two years from the alleged defamatory statement bars the claim under Texas law.
  • Courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend when there is substantial delay, the amendment would be futile, or the underlying claims are barred by law.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces the finality of prior judgments and prevents serial relitigation of the same employment disputes under different legal theories. For employees, it demonstrates that losing on summary judgment in an initial employment discrimination suit likely forecloses subsequent lawsuits alleging the same underlying facts, even with creative pleading. The ruling also illustrates the interplay between federal employment law (ADEA) and state common law: while employees have federal remedies for age discrimination, they cannot circumvent those remedies or their procedural requirements by reframing employment disputes as general tort claims.

The decision is significant for practitioners because it shows that courts will apply res judicata principles strictly to prevent repeated filings based on the same nucleus of facts, and that Texas’s exclusive employment discrimination remedy provision is broadly construed to preempt common-law alternatives. The denial of leave to amend based on delay and futility also reflects courts’ impatience with dilatory litigation tactics and serial lawsuits filed by pro se litigants.

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