Background
Linda Horton, individually and as executrix of her late husband Barney Horton Jr.’s estate, pursued Kentucky-law product-liability and negligence claims against General Electric and other defendants. She alleged that Mr. Horton developed malignant mesothelioma after exposure to asbestos-containing products at GE’s Appliance Park in Louisville, including exposure through his own work and asbestos dust carried home on his father’s clothing.
After learning that Mr. Horton had served aboard the USS Cascade and had reported asbestos exposure during his Navy service, GE removed the action under the federal-officer-removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. GE sought to assert a government-contractor defense based on its alleged supply of turbines to the ship. Horton amended her complaint to disclaim and waive any claim or recovery arising from asbestos exposure during military service, aboard military vessels, or around marine equipment on those vessels. The district court then remanded the case to Kentucky state court.
The Court’s Holding
The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, the court held that subject-matter jurisdiction follows the operative amended complaint in federal-officer cases as well as in cases removed under the general removal statute. Once Horton eliminated all claims based on federally directed conduct, the action no longer fell within § 1442 and GE had no colorable federal defense to the claims that remained.
The court rejected GE’s contention that possible Navy exposure made the remaining civilian-exposure claims sufficiently related to federal conduct. Horton’s disclaimer separated the challenged conduct by time and location: the lawsuit targeted alleged asbestos exposure connected to GE’s civilian operations in Kentucky, not GE’s work under Navy contracts. Questions about whether military exposure contributed to Mr. Horton’s injury concerned causation or apportionment, not a government-contractor defense to the conduct actually challenged. The court did not decide whether a future allocation of damages between federal and nonfederal sources would itself require determination in federal court.
Key Takeaways
- An amended complaint can eliminate federal-officer jurisdiction after removal when it removes every claim tied to conduct performed under federal direction.
- An express disclaimer is effective when it clearly separates the challenged nonfederal conduct from federal conduct by factors such as time and location.
- A possible federal contribution to the plaintiff’s injury does not establish federal-officer jurisdiction without a close connection between the challenged conduct and acts performed under federal authority.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that the operative complaint controls the continuing existence of federal-officer jurisdiction in the Sixth Circuit. Defendants cannot preserve a federal forum merely by invoking a federal defense applicable only to claims that the plaintiff has expressly removed from the case.
The ruling is especially significant in asbestos and other cumulative-exposure litigation, where injuries may have multiple sources. It distinguishes ordinary state-law causation and apportionment questions from defenses protecting contractors against liability for federally directed conduct.