Background
Dominic Archibald retained attorney Ernest L. Jarrett under a contingency-fee agreement to pursue claims arising from the police killing of Archibald’s son. Jarrett alleged that he helped initiate the wrongful-death action and remained counsel of record, but that Archibald and other attorneys concealed the eventual settlement and did not pay him his claimed share.
Jarrett and his law practice sued Archibald for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, deprivation of attorney fees, conspiracy, breach of an implied contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that prior litigation barred the claims and, alternatively, that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim.
The Court’s Holding
The Sixth Circuit affirmed solely on failure-to-state-a-claim grounds and did not reach claim preclusion. Applying Michigan law, the court held that Jarrett did not plausibly allege full performance of the broad representation required by the contingency agreement. His allegations that he helped file the complaint and remained counsel of record did not show completion of all contracted services through a trial and post-trial proceedings, as required to recover under the agreement.
The unjust-enrichment claim also failed because Jarrett had previously alleged that Archibald paid the contingency fee to other attorneys, making those attorneys—not Archibald—the proper targets of any claim to those funds. The remaining claims were unsupported, duplicative, or conclusory. Dismissal with prejudice was within the district court’s discretion because Jarrett never formally sought amendment or explained how he could cure the defects, possessed the relevant information, and had pursued related compensation claims in multiple forums.
Key Takeaways
- Under Michigan law, an attorney seeking recovery under a contingency-fee agreement must plausibly allege complete performance of the services covered by that agreement.
- Merely helping file a complaint and remaining counsel of record did not plausibly establish full representation through trial and post-trial proceedings.
- A court may dismiss with prejudice when a plaintiff neither formally requests amendment nor identifies additional facts that would cure the pleading defects.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the distinction between contractual recovery of a contingency fee and quantum-meruit recovery for the reasonable value of incomplete services. Attorneys asserting fee claims must plead concrete facts describing their work and must direct restitution claims toward the parties who allegedly retained the benefit.
It also confirms that Rule 15’s liberal amendment policy does not require courts to offer amendment sua sponte when a knowledgeable plaintiff does not request it or explain how amendment would help.