Background
Michael Jezior joined the Chicago Fire Department in 1997 and later served as an engineer-paramedic. In 2013, he suffered a stroke that left him with limited mobility on his left side, difficulty standing for extended periods, and the need for a leg brace to walk. Because he could no longer perform the essential duties of an engineer-paramedic, the Department accommodated him by placing him in a non-firefighting procurement role at O’Hare Airport, where he worked for nearly eight years.
By March 2021, Jezior’s name reached the top of the eligibility list for lieutenant promotions. He and his supervisor initially expected he would be promoted in place — retaining his airport procurement duties at a higher rank and pay grade. Deputy Fire Commissioner Brian Helmold disagreed, informing Jezior that all available lieutenant positions at the airport required firefighting, which Jezior could not perform. Jezior was offered two paths: accept the promotion and engage the Department’s disability accommodation process to find a suitable lieutenant position elsewhere (with a possible opening in the Fire Prevention Bureau), or waive the promotion and remain in his current role. Jezior declined to submit the required accommodation paperwork, citing fear that he would fail medical clearance and be forced into early retirement, and he remained at the airport at his existing rank.
Jezior sued the City of Chicago under the ADA, alleging failure to provide a reasonable accommodation and disability discrimination. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Jorge L. Alonso) granted summary judgment for the City. Jezior appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City on both claims, in an opinion by Judge Kolar joined by Chief Judge Brennan and Judge Lee. On the failure-to-accommodate claim, the court held that Jezior was not a “qualified individual” for an in-place lieutenant promotion because no lieutenant position at O’Hare existed that did not require firefighting — a duty he admittedly could not perform. The ADA does not obligate an employer to create a new position or strip an existing one of its essential functions to accommodate a disabled employee, a principle the court said is especially strong in public-safety contexts. The court also held that, even assuming Jezior were qualified, his requested accommodation was not reasonable because employers are not required to provide the specific accommodation an employee prefers.
The court further held that Jezior voluntarily terminated the ADA’s required interactive process by refusing to file accommodation paperwork or explore alternatives offered by the Department and its disability officer. His claim that he faced a “Hobson’s choice” between the promotion and early retirement was speculative — the very purpose of the interactive process was to develop the facts necessary to identify a viable accommodation, and Jezior short-circuited that process before any outcome could be known.
On the disability-discrimination claim, the court held that Jezior failed on both the “qualified individual” element (for the same reasons) and on causation. His three proposed comparators — employees without disabilities who he alleged received in-place promotions — were not similarly situated: two held exempt-rank positions subject to a different appointment process, and the third was waived because Jezior failed to develop the argument below or on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- An employer in a public-safety context is not required to create a new position or eliminate essential functions — including rarely performed firefighting duties — to accommodate a disabled employee, even if that employee has successfully performed a modified role for years.
- The ADA’s interactive accommodation process is a two-way obligation; an employee who refuses to engage in that process — for example, by declining to submit required medical paperwork — cannot later claim the employer failed to accommodate him.
- Proposed comparators must be genuinely similarly situated; employees in exempt-rank positions filled through commissioner appointment are not comparable to civil-service candidates seeking a promotion with a pay increase through a standard eligibility list.
- Speculation about worst-case outcomes from an accommodation process that was never attempted cannot substitute for evidence of an employer’s failure to accommodate.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces settled Seventh Circuit doctrine that disabled employees bear a meaningful obligation to participate in the ADA’s interactive accommodation process. Employers who present a good-faith menu of options — even imperfect ones — are protected when the employee unilaterally declines to pursue any of them. For public-safety agencies in particular, the ruling affirms their latitude to insist that even rarely exercised firefighting or emergency functions remain essential job requirements, shielding workforce-management decisions (such as civilianization cost-cutting programs) from ADA second-guessing so long as the rationale is consistent and legitimate.
For practitioners, the case illustrates the importance of documenting the interactive process carefully and offering concrete alternatives in writing. It also serves as a reminder that employees who fear the outcome of an accommodation evaluation cannot bypass that process and then claim constructive denial — courts will not assume the worst-case scenario when the employee was the one who walked away.