Background
Chicago police officers responded to a 911 report that several Black men had pointed guns at a motorist at a gas station. They found four Black men in an SUV near the reported pump, including Jevarreo Kelley-Lomax in the front passenger seat. During an unchallenged search, an officer found a loaded handgun hidden beneath that seat. Kelley-Lomax said he lacked the licenses required to carry a gun, although officers learned that his brother had rented the SUV and was licensed to carry one.
Kelley-Lomax was charged with aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Officer Robert Garduno later gave grand-jury and trial testimony that included disputed descriptions of the suspects and surveillance footage. After the prosecution rested at trial, the state judge directed a verdict for Kelley-Lomax because the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the gun was beneath his seat. Kelley-Lomax then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The district court granted the officers summary judgment, finding probable cause fatal to both claims.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. On the false-arrest claim, the majority held that the gun’s location directly beneath the seat Kelley-Lomax had occupied, the reported gun-related incident, and his admission that he lacked authorization to carry provided probable cause to believe he possessed the weapon. Facts suggesting innocence—including that the gun was concealed, that Kelley-Lomax did not own or drive the SUV, and that his brother had a gun license—could create reasonable doubt at trial but did not eliminate probable cause to arrest.
The majority also held that probable cause barred the malicious-prosecution claim. It assumed a reasonable jury could find that officers recklessly made false statements about the caller’s descriptions, their ability to reconnect with the caller, and what surveillance footage showed. But after removing the disputed statements, the gun beneath Kelley-Lomax’s seat and his lack of a license still supplied probable cause to prosecute him. Judge Lee concurred as to false arrest but dissented as to malicious prosecution, reasoning that the remaining evidence showed only proximity to a hidden gun and did not support probable cause on the required knowledge element.
Key Takeaways
- Probable cause to arrest requires a reasonable, commonsense belief in criminal involvement, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt or specific evidence establishing every element of the offense.
- A plaintiff challenging probable cause for prosecution after an indictment must show not only fabrication or omission, but also that probable cause disappears once false information is removed and material omissions are included.
- Exculpatory facts that may support acquittal do not defeat probable cause when they do not conclusively negate the reasonable inference supporting arrest and prosecution.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes the evidentiary burden needed to convict from the substantially lower threshold for probable cause. An acquittal or directed verdict therefore does not, by itself, establish that an earlier arrest or prosecution violated the Fourth Amendment.
The divided ruling also highlights disagreement over how closely probable cause to prosecute must track each element of the charged offense, particularly knowledge in constructive-possession cases, and confirms that alleged police fabrication will not sustain a malicious-prosecution claim when the untainted evidence independently establishes probable cause.