Background
Jared Kennedy fled after Officer Micah Kaminski attempted to stop him for speeding. During the ensuing 20-minute pursuit, Kennedy drove off the road, crashed into a tree, lost his rear bumper, continued for miles on a flat tire, and drove away after Deputy Gary Hicks performed a PIT maneuver. The pursuit ended when Kennedy parked in his driveway.
After Kennedy left the vehicle, he did not comply with commands to get on the ground and place his hands behind his back. He kept his hands beneath his body and pushed himself off the ground while officers tried to handcuff him. Kennedy alleged that Hicks and Sheriff Aaron Acree punched and kicked him, struck him with a baton, and ground his face into the pavement. Body-camera footage showed Hicks pulling Kennedy’s hair and punching his side twice, and Acree acknowledged delivering two or three baton strikes. The officers stopped using force once Kennedy was handcuffed.
Kennedy pleaded guilty to wanton endangerment, criminal mischief, and failure to maintain required automobile insurance. He later sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and asserted state-law tort claims. The district court excluded legal conclusions offered by Kennedy’s police-practices expert and granted the officers summary judgment. Kennedy appealed only as to Hicks and Acree.
The Court’s Holding
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Hicks and Acree’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. The court considered the entire encounter, including Kennedy’s prolonged flight, the damaged and unidentified vehicle, the officers’ uncertainty about whether Kennedy or someone inside the darkened residence might be armed, and Kennedy’s physical refusal to surrender his hands. It concluded that baton strikes, punches, and kicks used to secure his hands were constitutionally permissible while he actively resisted arrest.
Kennedy’s explanation that he kept his body raised because of a pre-existing injury did not alter the analysis. He admitted that the officers had no reason to know of the injury, and his statements that he was not resisting and that his arm would not bend did not require the officers to disregard his contrary physical conduct.
The court also held that Hicks and Acree were independently entitled to qualified immunity because Kennedy identified no sufficiently similar precedent placing the alleged constitutional violation beyond debate. Finally, it found no abuse of discretion in excluding the expert’s opinions that the officers used excessive or unconstitutional force because those opinions stated legal conclusions rather than permissible police-practices testimony.
Key Takeaways
- A court assessing force used during an arrest may consider earlier events, including a vehicle pursuit, rather than isolating the final moments of the encounter.
- A suspect who conceals his hands, pushes against the ground, disobeys commands, and physically prevents handcuffing may be treated as actively resisting, permitting officers to use reasonable force to secure him.
- A suspect’s undisclosed injury or assertion that he is not resisting does not control the objective-reasonableness analysis when officers lack knowledge of the injury and observe contrary physical conduct.
- An expert may address discrete police-practice issues but may not opine that force was excessive, unreasonable, or unconstitutional.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that the Fourth Amendment’s totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry can encompass conduct preceding the precise moment force is used. A dangerous flight and continued resistance may shape what a reasonable officer perceives and what force is permissible during handcuffing.
It also underscores two recurring barriers to excessive-force claims: plaintiffs must identify precedent closely matching the facts to overcome qualified immunity, and they cannot use expert testimony to supply the court’s legal conclusion about whether force was constitutional.