Background
Phyllis M. Knight, proceeding without counsel, sued the United States seeking retirement benefits under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act, compensation under the Back Pay Act, and relief based on alleged theft or embezzlement of benefits under a federal criminal statute. In January 2025, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Knight later moved for relief from that judgment under Rule 60(b), asserting newly discovered evidence and fraud. She alleged that the government contracted with psychologist Dr. Christopher Milne to falsify her medical records and avoid paying disability-retirement benefits, and she further alleged a conspiracy involving the Office of Personnel Management, the Social Security Administration, and the Merit Systems Protection Board.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied Knight’s motion. It held that the evidence concerning Dr. Milne would not have changed the jurisdictional basis for the earlier dismissal. The Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over Knight’s FERS-related, Back Pay Act, and criminal-statute claims, and the asserted evidence would not have supplied jurisdiction or produced a different result.
The court also found that the evidence was not newly discovered because Knight had raised concerns about Dr. Milne’s report during earlier administrative proceedings and was aware of his involvement before her case was dismissed. Her broad allegations of a multi-agency conspiracy likewise did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of fraud as required for relief under Rule 60(b)(3).
Key Takeaways
- New evidence does not justify reopening a judgment when it would not cure the jurisdictional defect that required dismissal.
- Evidence known to a litigant before judgment is not “newly discovered” for purposes of Rule 60(b)(2).
- Unsubstantiated allegations and ambiguous assertions of conspiracy do not satisfy the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for Rule 60(b)(3) fraud.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that Rule 60(b) is not a means to relitigate a dismissed case without evidence capable of changing the original outcome. Where dismissal rested on lack of jurisdiction, the movant must identify material new evidence that could alter that jurisdictional conclusion.
It also illustrates the demanding evidentiary requirements for reopening a judgment based on fraud, even when the movant is proceeding pro se.