Background
Brooke Mason worked as a pharmacist at Cook County Health’s Stroger Hospital, sharing a room with approximately 60 pharmacy employees, counseling patients monthly, and sometimes delivering medication to a floor treating COVID-19 patients. During pandemic-related staffing shortages, Cook County required employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, relying on public-health guidance that vaccination reduced transmission and serious illness and that masking, distancing, and testing alone were insufficient.
Mason requested a religious exemption based on her Christian belief that she must keep her body pure. The County limited exemptions to employees able to work fully remotely, and Mason’s position required in-person work. After giving her 90 days to find a remote position, the County terminated her when none was available. Mason sued under Title VII for failure to accommodate and disparate treatment. The district court granted summary judgment to the County.
The Court’s Holding
A divided Seventh Circuit affirmed. Assuming without deciding that Mason established a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim based on a sincerely held religious belief, the majority held that no reasonable jury could find the County could accommodate her without undue hardship. The County’s affidavits, scientific research, CDC guidance, and experience with hospital outbreaks sufficiently showed that allowing an unvaccinated pharmacist to work near coworkers and vulnerable patients would create substantial safety and operational burdens. Mason offered no evidence that masking and distancing would provide a reasonable alternative to vaccination.
The court also rejected Mason’s reliance on an employee identified as “Sanitarian I.” That employee participated in a blinded vaccine study, worked in a different job and location under different supervisors, and received a vaccine after learning she had received a placebo. The employees were not similarly situated in material respects, defeating Mason’s disparate-treatment claim. Judge Taibleson dissented, concluding that the County’s generalized affidavits did not prove undue hardship under the demanding summary-judgment standard and that a jury should assess both claims.
Key Takeaways
- An employer establishes undue hardship under Title VII by showing that a proposed religious accommodation would impose substantial increased costs in the context of its particular operations, including safety and staffing consequences.
- Evidence based on public-health guidance, workplace experience, and the employee’s actual exposure to coworkers and vulnerable patients can support summary judgment for a healthcare employer.
- A comparator with a different job, location, supervisor, vaccination history, and response to enforcement is not similarly situated merely because the same organization-wide vaccine policy applied.
Why It Matters
This is the Seventh Circuit’s first appellate decision addressing summary judgment on undue hardship in a COVID-19 vaccine religious-accommodation case. It confirms that healthcare employers may rely on documented patient-safety and operational risks to defend vaccination requirements, even without presenting expert testimony or quantifying every anticipated cost.
The dissent underscores a continuing dispute over how particularized an employer’s proof must be after Groff v. DeJoy, especially when an employer adopted a categorical policy for all in-person workers rather than individually evaluating alternatives such as masking, testing, distancing, or partial remote work.