Background
Mara Morillo, who was born in Venezuela and entered the United States on a travel visa in 1996, pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. She told appointed counsel that remaining in the United States was her paramount concern. According to findings the First Circuit upheld, counsel assured her that she could serve her sentence and later “work out” her immigration status, although the conviction made her presumptively removable and permanently inadmissible.
After completing an 84-month prison sentence and three years of supervised release, Morillo received a removal notice in 2021. She attempted to contact her former defense counsel, consulted other attorneys, and retained new counsel in February 2025. She then sought a writ of error coram nobis, alleging ineffective assistance under Padilla v. Kentucky and Lee v. United States. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the writ and vacated her conviction. The government appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court neither committed legal error nor abused its discretion in granting coram nobis relief. The majority concluded that Morillo adequately explained why she had not challenged her conviction earlier. Conditional warnings in her plea agreement and plea colloquy that she “may” face deportation did not correct counsel’s assurance that she could resolve her immigration status after release. Nor did counsel’s sentencing argument that she was “going to be deported” necessarily notify her that his earlier advice was wrong.
The court also upheld the finding of constitutionally deficient performance. Because the immigration consequences were clear, Padilla required correspondingly clear advice rather than a general warning about a possible risk. The court further found prejudice: credited evidence showed that remaining in the United States was Morillo’s overriding concern, that she would have gone to trial if properly advised, and that evidence of abuse and coercive control by her husband could have supported a challenge to the government’s proof that she knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy. Finally, the district court permissibly determined that the equities favored relief despite the government’s interests in finality and the difficulty of retrying an older case.
Judge Dunlap dissented, reasoning that Morillo’s petition was untimely because counsel’s unequivocal statements at sentencing in 2017, and at the latest the 2021 removal notice, informed her that deportation would result from the conviction. The dissent also expressed reservations about the prejudice evidence and the district court’s treatment of the government’s finality and retrial interests.
Key Takeaways
- When a plea’s immigration consequences are clear, defense counsel must provide clear and accurate advice; an equivocal warning about possible deportation may be insufficient.
- A court may find delay in seeking coram nobis relief justified when the petitioner reasonably relied on counsel’s affirmative misadvice and acted after learning that the advice was wrong.
- A defendant can establish plea-stage prejudice without proving likely acquittal if credited evidence shows that avoiding deportation was paramount and proceeding to trial would not have been irrational.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that coram nobis may remain available after a sentence has been completed when a guilty plea rested on fundamentally defective immigration advice and continues to carry severe consequences. It also underscores the importance of distinguishing between a conviction that might create immigration problems and one whose immigration consequences are clear.
At the same time, the divided opinion highlights an important timeliness dispute: whether later statements or removal notices trigger a duty to challenge the conviction despite earlier contrary advice from defense counsel. The majority treated that inquiry as context-specific and deferred to the district court’s findings, while the dissent viewed the delay as fatal under circuit precedent.