Background
Devon Nobles, a U.S. citizen, is married to Anqi Liu, a Chinese citizen present in the United States on H-1B visa status. Nobles was convicted in 2013 of aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving a minor. Liu knew of the conviction when the couple married in 2015. Nobles filed two Form I-130 petitions seeking to classify Liu as his immediate relative so she could adjust her immigration status and obtain permanent residence. USCIS denied both petitions, determining that Nobles failed to demonstrate he “poses no risk” to Liu under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.
The Adam Walsh Act prohibits citizens convicted of specified offenses against minors from sponsoring immediate relatives unless the Secretary of Homeland Security determines in the Secretary’s “sole and unreviewable discretion” that the citizen poses no risk to the beneficiary. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). The Immigration and Nationality Act separately strips courts of jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions of the Secretary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Nobles and Liu sued under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging four statutory violations and nine constitutional claims. The district court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction, except for one statutory count, which it dismissed on the merits. The plaintiffs appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over three of the four statutory claims because the Adam Walsh Act’s plain language commits the entire no-risk determination—both the final decision and the procedures used to reach it—to the Secretary’s “sole and unreviewable discretion.” The word “determines” encompasses more than the ultimate decision; it includes the process of reaching that decision. Subjecting the agency’s evidentiary standards or factfinding to judicial review would conflict with Congress’s explicit grant of sole and unreviewable discretion to the Secretary.
As for the fourth statutory claim, the court had jurisdiction to address the “predicate legal question” of whether the Adam Walsh Act applies only to minor beneficiaries. Examining the statute’s plain text, the court held that the no-risk determination applies regardless of the beneficiary’s age. The statute refers broadly to “the alien with respect to whom a petition described in clause (i) is filed” without limiting it to minors, even though Congress knew how to impose age restrictions when it chose to do so elsewhere in the statute.
Regarding the nine constitutional claims, the court held it lacked jurisdiction because the Immigration and Nationality Act channels such claims to removal proceedings only. Section 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves review of constitutional claims, but only within petitions for review of final removal orders filed in the courts of appeals. Congress enacted this provision in response to INS v. St. Cyr to ensure constitutional claims receive a forum without permitting direct APA suits.
Key Takeaways
- The Adam Walsh Act’s grant of “sole and unreviewable discretion” to the Secretary covers both the discretionary decision and the methodology and procedures employed in reaching it, precluding judicial review of evidentiary standards and adjudicatory processes.
- The no-risk determination applies to beneficiaries of any age, not only minors, despite the Act’s focus on child protection—Congress did not restrict it textually.
- Constitutional and statutory claims challenging discretionary immigration decisions must be raised in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); direct APA suits are barred.
- Six of seven federal circuits have now agreed that the Secretary’s discretion under the Adam Walsh Act is completely unreviewable; only the D.C. Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly limits the ability of citizens convicted of offenses against minors to challenge immigration agency denials of spousal or family-based petitions. Because the statute vests discretion in the Secretary without standards and explicitly renders it unreviewable, petitioners have virtually no recourse in federal court. The holding extends the government’s well-established plenary authority over immigration decisions to a particularly sensitive category—one involving criminal history and family relationships—leaving plaintiffs’ only option to pursue relief through administrative appeals or removal proceedings, where constitutional claims may theoretically be raised but rarely succeed.
The opinion also addresses a broader jurisprudential tension: the APA’s presumption favoring judicial review of agency action versus Congress’s sharp limitations on judicial oversight in the immigration context. The court resolved this by holding that explicit immigration-specific jurisdiction stripping trumps the APA’s general presumption, a principle the Seventh Circuit had previously established but here applies to the specific novel question of whether procedures governing an unreviewable discretionary decision are themselves reviewable. The alignment of six circuits on this interpretation suggests the issue is likely settled, though the D.C. Circuit’s contrary reasoning in Castaneira v. Noem creates potential for future Supreme Court review.