Russell v. Dep’t of Treasury — Remanded to decide if settlement agreement moots appeal

Case
TAMMY W. RUSSELL v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Judge
DAVIS (Joseph R. Biden, 2022); MATHIS (Joseph R. Biden, 2022); RITZ (Joseph R. Biden, 2024)
Date Decided
July 29, 2026
Docket No.
25-3239
Topics
Appellate Jurisdiction, Mootness, Settlement Agreements, Employment Law
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Plaintiff Tammy Russell, an employee of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), sued her employer, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, for disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of the Treasury Department, dismissing all of Russell’s claims.

Russell appealed the dismissal of her disability discrimination and retaliation claims to the Sixth Circuit. Shortly after filing her appeal, she entered into a Deferred Resignation Program Agreement (DRPA) with the IRS. The agreement placed her on paid administrative leave until a future resignation date and contained a provision stating that she waived “any and all claims” against the agency and would “immediately withdraw any and all . . . appeals.”

The Court’s Holding

The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court without reaching the merits of Russell’s appeal. The Treasury Department had moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the DRPA settled the dispute and therefore rendered the case moot. Russell opposed the dismissal, arguing she did not enter the agreement knowingly and voluntarily due to her anxiety and PTSD, and that she had sought to rescind it. This created a factual dispute about the validity of the agreement.

The court, in an opinion by Judge Davis, held that while a valid settlement can moot an appeal, appellate courts are not equipped to resolve factual disputes. When facts outside the record are contested—in this case, the circumstances surrounding the signing of the DRPA—the proper procedure is to remand to the district court. The court therefore sent the case back for the district court to determine whether the DRPA is an enforceable agreement that moots Russell’s appeal. Judge Mathis dissented, arguing that the court had jurisdiction and should have decided the appeal on the merits, affirming the district court’s original judgment.

Key Takeaways

  • A settlement agreement reached while a case is on appeal can make the appeal moot by extinguishing the parties’ legal interest in the outcome.
  • If the parties dispute the facts concerning the validity of a post-appeal settlement agreement, an appellate court will not resolve the factual dispute itself.
  • The proper course for an appellate court facing a factually disputed claim of mootness is to remand the case to the district court to conduct fact-finding and determine the issue in the first instance.

Why It Matters

This opinion provides a procedural roadmap for federal courts when faced with a potential settlement that arises mid-appeal. It reaffirms the principle that appellate courts are primarily reviewers of law, not finders of fact. When a jurisdictional question like mootness depends on unresolved factual issues—such as a party’s capacity to enter a contract—the case must be sent back to the trial court for resolution.

The ruling highlights a critical issue for litigators: a settlement doesn’t automatically end a case if its validity is challenged. The enforceability of the settlement itself can become a new legal battle, delaying finality and requiring further proceedings at the trial court level even after an appeal has been filed.

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