U.S. v. Marascio — Fifth Circuit affirmed conviction for PPP fraud conspiracy, finding sufficient evidence of knowledge and intent to defraud

Case
United States v. Eric Reed Marascio
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Decided
July 17, 2026
Docket No.
25-40088
Topics
PPP Fraud, Wire Fraud Conspiracy, Money Laundering, Sufficiency of Evidence
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Eric Reed Marascio participated in a conspiracy to defraud the Paycheck Protection Program. The scheme, orchestrated primarily by Andrew Moran, involved submitting false loan applications using inflated payroll figures and fabricated business expenses. Marascio owned the Hazelnut Café, a one-person business. In June 2020, after learning of the scheme from co-conspirator Michael Hill, Marascio provided his personal information and business address to Moran, who then submitted a PPP application falsely claiming the café employed nine workers with monthly payroll exceeding $90,298. The application was approved, and Marascio received $225,745.

Marascio then paid Moran a 10% fee from the proceeds, invested $150,000 with a purported foreign exchange trader (Jonathon Spencer), and spent $30,000 on a pickup truck. Marascio later asked Moran to pay him for recruiting additional loan applicants and successfully recruited Hector Reyes. Most co-conspirators pleaded guilty; Marascio and one other defendant went to trial. A jury deliberated less than ninety minutes before returning guilty verdicts on both conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. A grand jury had charged Marascio and seventeen others with these offenses.

The Court’s Holding

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Marascio’s conviction on all counts. Reviewing the sufficiency of evidence claim de novo but with substantial deference to the jury verdict, the court held that ample evidence supported Marascio’s knowledge of the scheme’s unlawful nature and his specific intent to defraud. The court found that although the Government presented no direct statement of Marascio’s knowledge, circumstantial evidence was sufficient: Marascio sought the loan through Moran’s pay-to-play model, spent none on actual payroll, invested most of the proceeds for personal gain, purchased luxury items, and later offered to recruit other fraudsters for compensation. Co-conspirator Hill’s testimony that everyone understood the plan was “to get PPP money and invest” it for personal gain and later pay the loans back “no harm, no foul” made clear that Marascio, as an active participant, knew the scheme was fraudulent.

Regarding Marascio’s challenge to a prosecutor’s closing argument, the court held that the prosecutor’s rhetorical question—”Why did they plead guilty, each of them?”—posed in response to defense arguments that only Moran understood the fraud was unlawful, was not improper. Applying the four-factor test for co-conspirator guilty plea evidence, the court found that the district court had given a limiting instruction, the statement served a proper evidentiary purpose (refuting the defense narrative rather than guilt-by-association), the pleas were mentioned only once, and although the defense did not invite their introduction, the defense’s reframing argument indirectly relied on co-conspirator credibility. Even assuming the statement was improper, the court found no substantial impairment of Marascio’s rights given the single mention, the jury instruction, and the strength of independent evidence of guilt.

Key Takeaways

  • Participation in a fraudulent scheme, coupled with circumstantial evidence of knowing receipt of illicit proceeds and active recruitment, establishes sufficient evidence of knowledge and intent to defraud for wire fraud conspiracy conviction.
  • Prosecutors may reference co-conspirators’ guilty pleas during closing argument to refute specific defense narratives that minimize a defendant’s knowledge or culpability, provided a jury instruction limits use of the pleas to the proper evidentiary purpose.
  • Preservation requirements remain strict: a defense objection coupled with a court ruling is ordinarily necessary to preserve prosecutorial misconduct claims, though harmless-error analysis applies even when the proper preservation standard is unclear.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces that PPP fraud prosecutions do not require direct evidence of a defendant’s subjective knowledge of illegality. Instead, courts will infer knowledge from a defendant’s active participation in the scheme, the manner in which proceeds are spent (personal luxury goods and investments rather than legitimate business expenses), and recruitment of additional conspirators for compensation. Prosecutors need not present a “smoking gun” confession; circumstantial evidence of participation paired with unreasonable explanations for loan proceeds suffices.

The holding also clarifies the narrow circumstances under which prosecutors may reference co-conspirators’ guilty pleas without improperly inflaming the jury. The key is tying the reference to refutation of a specific defense theory rather than general guilt-by-association. This matters for the growing docket of PPP fraud cases, where co-conspirators routinely plead guilty and testify against co-defendants, because it allows prosecutors to address credibility questions posed by defense counsel without fear of reversal when a proper limiting instruction is given and the reference is isolated.

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