Background
A jury convicted Sherriff Cooper of sex trafficking a minor and by force, fraud, or coercion; transporting a minor across state lines with intent that she engage in prostitution; and forced labor. The charges stemmed from Cooper’s relationship with J.C., whom he met when she was a pregnant 15-year-old in a Massachusetts program for young mothers. The evidence showed that Cooper later compelled J.C., while still a minor, to engage in commercial sex acts and take the proceeds to him.
J.C. later worked as an underage stripper at a New York club. The government alleged that Cooper used violence, threats, and a coercive scheme to make her perform and surrender her earnings. Cooper challenged the sex-trafficking count as duplicitous, disputed the sufficiency of the evidence on the sex-trafficking and interstate-transportation counts, and argued that the forced-labor count should have been tried in New York or submitted to the jury on venue.
The Court’s Holding
The First Circuit affirmed the sex-trafficking and interstate-transportation convictions. It held, as a matter of first impression in the circuit, that the acts listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)—such as recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, advertising, maintaining, patronizing, and soliciting—are alternative means of committing one sex-trafficking offense, not separate offenses. Count One therefore was not duplicitous, and Cooper was not entitled to a special unanimity instruction or an election of a single statutory theory.
The court also found the evidence sufficient on Counts One and Two. J.C.’s testimony and TextNow records supported the interstate-commerce element of sex trafficking, and the jury could infer that one purpose of Cooper’s April 2018 trip from Massachusetts to New York was to have J.C. engage in prostitution. But the court vacated the forced-labor conviction. Cooper had put venue genuinely in dispute through his testimony and arguments that the stripping-based forced-labor offense occurred wholly in New York, yet the district court refused to instruct the jury on venue. The omission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Key Takeaways
- Section 1591(a)(1)’s listed trafficking acts are alternative means, not ten separate crimes.
- Victim testimony and internet-based communications can support the interstate-commerce element of a federal sex-trafficking charge.
- When trial evidence genuinely disputes where a charged offense occurred and the defendant timely requests it, the jury must decide venue.
Why It Matters
The decision establishes First Circuit precedent on § 1591(a)(1)’s structure, allowing an indictment to allege multiple statutory trafficking acts without creating a duplicity problem. It also reinforces that venue is a jury question when material facts about the location of the offense are disputed.
For prosecutors, the ruling underscores the need to request a venue instruction in multidistrict cases where the evidence permits competing conclusions about where an offense began or occurred. For defense counsel, it provides a preservation framework for challenging venue through timely objections, record evidence, and a requested instruction.