Background
David Jankowski was convicted of thirty counts of unlawful drug distribution and healthcare fraud. The district court sentenced him to 240 months in prison and ordered him to pay $5.2 million in restitution, creating a lien on all his property rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3613. The United States commenced foreclosure proceedings on real property located at 301 N. Shore Drive in South Haven, Michigan, which was titled in David’s name alone.
Paula Jankowski, David’s spouse since 2011, filed a Notice of Interested Party on June 4, 2025—two business days before the hearing on the government’s summary judgment motion—claiming a vested legal and equitable interest in the property based on her contributions to its maintenance and financial productivity since their marriage. Paula’s attorney had been provided notice of both the foreclosure complaint and the summary judgment motion when initially filed, but Paula did not attend the hearing. The district court granted summary judgment for the government and struck Paula’s notice as an improper attempt to delay proceedings.
Paula then filed a motion to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) on July 30, 2025, over one year after the action commenced. The district court denied the motion, finding it untimely, that Paula had not demonstrated a substantial legal interest in the property, and that David could adequately represent any interest she possessed.
The Court’s Holding
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Paula’s motion to intervene, holding that Paula failed to satisfy the mandatory threshold requirement of timeliness under Rule 24(a). The court applied the five-factor timeliness test: (1) the point to which litigation had progressed; (2) the purpose for intervention; (3) the length of time before moving after learning of the interest; (4) prejudice to existing parties; and (5) unusual circumstances.
As to the first factor, Paula filed her motion after more than one year had elapsed, discovery had closed over four months prior, the dispositive motion deadline had passed, and summary judgment had already been granted—all factors indicating late-stage intervention unfavorably viewed by courts. On the second factor, even crediting Paula’s stated purpose of collecting foreclosure proceeds, she did not act promptly in pursuing that purpose. The third factor weighed against intervention because Paula’s counsel had known of the case since its inception and Paula herself knew about the property since marrying David, yet she took no action for over a year. As to the fourth factor, intervention would cause prejudice by delaying the foreclosure sale and requiring reconsideration of prior rulings on restitution. Paula’s conclusory reference to Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations, underdeveloped on appeal, satisfied no unusual circumstance under the fifth factor. Because Paula failed the timeliness threshold, the court declined to address whether she possessed a substantial legal interest or whether David could adequately represent her interests.
Key Takeaways
- Motions to intervene filed during final litigation stages face heightened scrutiny; proposed intervenors cannot adopt a “wait-and-see” approach once they know of their interest in the case.
- The timeliness requirement for intervention is mandatory and threshold in nature—failure to establish timeliness defeats intervention regardless of the strength of the underlying legal interest.
- Spouses asserting marital property interests in assets titled solely to one spouse must intervene promptly in foreclosure or restitution proceedings; delayed intervention after judgment is entered will be denied as untimely.
- Failure to appear at key hearings and provide only perfunctory argument on legal standards weighs against finding intervention timely.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that procedural requirements for intervention are strictly enforced in federal court, even when a proposed intervenor may possess substantive rights. For spouses seeking to protect marital interests in property subject to criminal restitution liens, the window to intervene is narrow—it must occur early in the foreclosure proceeding, not after summary judgment is granted. The decision illustrates that the criminal justice system prioritizes satisfaction of restitution obligations to victims over post-conviction claims by family members regarding asset disposition.
The ruling also clarifies that courts will not overlook timeliness defects based on potentially meritorious underlying claims. Paula’s assertion of marital property interests—which might have succeeded if asserted timely—was entirely foreclosed by her failure to move promptly. This reflects the federal courts’ preference for finality and efficient case management, particularly in foreclosure proceedings where delay impairs the government’s ability to satisfy criminal judgments.