Background
In 2011, Oscar Ortega-Hernandez fired at least eight rounds from an AK-47-style rifle at the White House. No one was injured, but bullets struck the building, caused significant damage, and endangered people nearby. He later pleaded guilty to an enhanced offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1363 for willfully and maliciously injuring a dwelling or placing a life in jeopardy within the United States’ special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, and to using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The § 1363 offense served as the predicate crime of violence.
After the Supreme Court invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause in United States v. Davis, Ortega-Hernandez moved to vacate his § 924(c) conviction. The district court denied relief, concluding that his § 1363 conviction qualified under § 924(c)’s remaining force clause. Ortega-Hernandez appealed after receiving a certificate of appealability.
The Court’s Holding
The D.C. Circuit affirmed. It first held that Ortega-Hernandez could overcome his procedural default even though he had not challenged the residual clause on direct appeal. Supreme Court precedent had made the vagueness claim unavailable before Johnson v. United States, establishing cause, and a conviction no longer authorized by law would establish actual prejudice if his merits argument were correct.
On the merits, the court held that § 1363’s enhanced dwelling-injury offense categorically requires the use of physical force against another person’s property and therefore qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause. The court reasoned that willfully and maliciously injuring a dwelling requires intentionally causing a material impairment, which necessarily entails physical force capable of causing that injury. Examining § 1363’s history and its roots in arson and malicious-mischief law, the court also concluded that the statute covers injury to another person’s property, not the offender’s own property. Because the less culpable dwelling-injury alternative satisfied the force clause, the court did not decide which alternative underlying Ortega-Hernandez’s plea controlled.
Key Takeaways
- Willfully and maliciously injuring a dwelling under § 1363 categorically involves physical force against another person’s property.
- The enhanced § 1363 offense may serve as a predicate crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause despite the invalidation of § 924(c)’s residual clause.
- A defendant may establish cause for procedural default when binding Supreme Court precedent made the later-recognized constitutional claim not reasonably available during the direct appeal.
Why It Matters
The decision preserves § 924(c) convictions predicated on § 1363’s enhanced dwelling-injury offense and clarifies that the force clause reaches intentional, material damage to another person’s property, not only violence against a person.
It also provides guidance for post-Davis collateral challenges by explaining when an intervening Supreme Court decision can supply cause for failing to raise a vagueness claim earlier.