Background
Jesse Shane Owens was serving supervised release following a federal conviction for possessing a firearm and ammunition while subject to a domestic-violence restraining order. His probation officer petitioned to revoke his release after Owens was accused of new criminal conduct, including first-degree assault and battery under South Carolina law.
At the revocation hearing, the victim testified that Owens confined her in his home for about eight hours while biting, choking, and repeatedly punching her, causing her to lose consciousness intermittently. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Owens committed first-degree assault and battery under South Carolina Code § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i), classified the conduct as a Grade A violation, and calculated an advisory range of 12 to 18 months. It imposed the statutory maximum of 24 months’ imprisonment, followed by 12 months of supervised release. Owens had not objected to the offense classification or violation grade.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Its precedent in United States v. Mack holds that first-degree assault and battery under § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i)—offering or attempting to injure another by means likely to produce death or great bodily injury—is categorically a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. That precedent establishes both the required level of violent force and the absence of reckless conduct from the relevant statutory alternative.
The court rejected Owens’s argument that the South Carolina Supreme Court’s later decision in United States v. Clemons undermined Mack. Clemons addressed different offenses—criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature and second-degree assault and battery—and did not decide whether the first-degree offense at issue here could be committed recklessly. Because Mack remained binding, and because Owens had not preserved his argument, the district court did not plainly err by following controlling circuit precedent.
Key Takeaways
- South Carolina first-degree assault and battery under § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i) remains a crime of violence under binding Fourth Circuit precedent.
- Clemons did not displace Mack because it addressed different South Carolina offenses and did not analyze first-degree assault and battery.
- A district court does not plainly err by applying directly controlling circuit precedent that has not been rendered untenable by intervening authority.
Why It Matters
The decision preserves the Grade A classification of supervised-release violations based on the relevant form of South Carolina first-degree assault and battery. It also illustrates the difficulty of challenging an unobjected-to Guidelines classification when existing circuit precedent squarely resolves the issue.
More broadly, the opinion emphasizes that a later state-court decision concerning similar offenses does not unsettle federal circuit precedent unless it clearly addresses the same statutory offense or otherwise makes the earlier decision untenable.