Background
Anne Pramaggiore served as CEO of Commonwealth Edison Company (2012–2018) and then Exelon Corporation. Michael McClain worked as a ComEd lobbyist. Together, they engaged in a scheme with Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan and his associates spanning eight years, in which ComEd and Exelon paid over $1.3 million to Madigan’s associates through no-show contracts and subcontractor arrangements, without properly reporting the changes or services rendered. McClain served as the connection between ComEd and Madigan, coordinating the transactions while both companies sought favorable legislation.
A jury convicted Pramaggiore and McClain on nine counts: one conspiracy count under 18 U.S.C. § 371, four counts of corruptly offering things of value under 18 U.S.C. § 666, and four counts of falsifying books and records under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The conspiracy indictment charged four objects: corruptly soliciting and demanding things of value under § 666(a)(1)(B); corruptly giving things of value under § 666(a)(2); falsifying books, records, or accounts; and circumventing internal accounting controls.
After conviction, the Supreme Court decided two cases that undermined the legal basis for the jury instructions: Snyder v. United States (2024) limited § 666 to quid pro quo bribery and excluded gratuities, and Thompson v. United States (2025) held that “false” does not include merely “misleading” statements. The district court vacated the § 666 convictions but upheld the conspiracy and FCPA convictions, finding the error harmless.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Circuit vacated both the conspiracy and FCPA convictions, holding that the error was not harmless. The panel applied the rule from Stromberg v. California and Yates v. United States: when a general jury verdict could rest on multiple theories and at least one theory is legally invalid, the conviction must be vacated unless the record demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that the jury convicted on a valid theory instead.
For the conspiracy conviction, two of the four charged objects (the § 666 violations) were invalidated by Snyder. The jury received only a general verdict with no indication of which objects it relied upon. The court rejected the government’s harmless-error argument, holding that the evidence supporting a conspiracy to bribe was not “coextensive” with evidence of a conspiracy to violate the FCPA. Therefore, it was possible—even if unlikely—that the jury convicted solely on the invalid § 666 theories. The jury’s right to determine guilt and the Sixth Amendment prohibition on reducing the government’s burden of proof compelled vacatur.
The FCPA convictions required vacatur for a related reason. The government had sought and obtained a Pinkerton instruction permitting conviction if defendants were co-conspirators in furtherance of a valid conspiracy. Because the underlying conspiracy conviction was tainted by legally invalid objects, the jury might have convicted under the Pinkerton theory resting on an invalid conspiracy. Regarding the defendants’ Thompson argument (that the records were merely misleading, not false), the court found sufficient evidence of actual falsification in the contracts and invoices, so acquittal was not warranted. However, defendants are not foreclosed from retrial on valid legal theories.
Key Takeaways
- When a jury returns a general verdict on a multi-object conspiracy charge and one or more objects are later deemed invalid, the conviction cannot stand unless the government proves beyond reasonable doubt that the jury convicted on a remaining valid object.
- Evidence supporting one theory of guilt (bribery gratuities) is not necessarily coextensive with evidence of another valid theory (FCPA falsification), so harmless-error analysis cannot assume the jury convicted on both.
- Pinkerton liability (conviction for co-conspirators’ crimes) fails if the underlying conspiracy itself is legally infirm, because proving conspiracy is a necessary predicate.
- The Seventh Circuit adheres to a more defendant-protective harmless-error standard than some other circuits, requiring actual certainty about which theory the jury adopted rather than merely weighing evidence.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that post-conviction changes in law—such as Snyder’s narrowing of § 666—can invalidate convictions when jury instructions permitted conviction on now-invalid theories. It illustrates the importance of specific jury instructions and individual verdict forms, as general verdicts leave courts unable to determine which theory the jury credited. For prosecutors, the decision means that when Supreme Court precedent narrows a statute’s scope, prior convictions using broader jury instructions remain vulnerable to vacatur, even where evidence of guilt on alternative valid grounds is strong.
The opinion also clarifies Seventh Circuit doctrine on multi-object conspiracy errors and distinguishes cases like Turner (where evidence was overlapping). Defendants retain the right to retrial, and the government may proceed without relying on the invalidated § 666 theories or on Pinkerton liability premised on an invalid conspiracy. For the ComEd-Exelon corruption case, the holding opens the door to a new trial on the underlying FCPA falsification charges and any valid conspiracy theory.