Background
Curtis Washington, convicted in the Eastern District of North Carolina (Judge Louise W. Flanagan), sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Proceeding pro se on appeal, he argued that intervening Supreme Court decisions—Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022), and Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024)—changed the law governing the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), such that he would no longer qualify as an armed career criminal under current doctrine. He contended that the resulting sentencing disparity constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.
The district court denied the motion, concluding that Washington had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief. Washington timely appealed.
The Court’s Holding
A unanimous per curiam panel (Judges Gregory, Rushing, and Senior Judge Keenan) affirmed, applying abuse-of-discretion review. The court acknowledged that a sentencing disparity produced by an intervening change in the law can, in principle, qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647, 657–58 (4th Cir. 2024).
However, under the Sentencing Commission’s amended policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) and (c) (2025), a change in the law may serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason only when the movant has served at least 10 years of imprisonment. Because Washington had not yet served 10 years, the § 1B1.13(b)(6) ground was categorically unavailable to him, and the district court committed no reversible error in denying relief. The panel noted, without deciding the merits, that Washington may become eligible to refile once he satisfies the 10-year threshold.
Key Takeaways
- Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (2025), a defendant cannot rely on an intervening change in sentencing law as an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release unless he has served at least 10 years in prison—regardless of the strength of the underlying legal argument.
- The Fourth Circuit confirmed that Wooden and Erlinger-based ACCA sentencing disparities are cognizable considerations under § 3582(c)(1)(A), but the 10-year floor is a threshold eligibility requirement, not merely a discretionary factor.
- Defendants who do not yet meet the 10-year requirement are not permanently barred; they may file a new motion once the requirement is satisfied, leaving the merits of any § 1B1.13(b)(6) argument for the district court to consider in the first instance.
Why It Matters
This unpublished decision illustrates the practical gatekeeping function of § 1B1.13(b)(6)’s 10-year floor for defendants seeking compassionate release based on post-sentencing legal changes. As the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wooden and Erlinger continue to ripple through ACCA cases, many defendants who were sentenced under a broader interpretation of the statute are filing § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions. This case makes clear that, in the Fourth Circuit, even a potentially meritorious sentencing-disparity argument cannot proceed unless the defendant has crossed the 10-year imprisonment threshold set by the Sentencing Commission.
The court’s explicit notice that Washington may refile once he meets the requirement signals that the underlying ACCA question remains open and unresolved on the merits—leaving the door ajar for future litigation as more defendants accrue the required time served.