Background
Until June 2026, the NCAA generally limited Division I athletes to four seasons of competition within five years. It then adopted a rule generally permitting five seasons in five years, but declined to apply that change retroactively to athletes who had already completed four seasons. The NCAA explained that those athletes had received the full eligibility previously allowed and that another season would disrupt settled expectations concerning roster positions and playing time shortly before the coming season.
The plaintiffs entered college in 2022, competed in four consecutive seasons, and finished their fourth season at a Division I school during the 2025–26 academic year. They sought a fifth season and, except for Abigail Jefferies, alleged that they had received name, image, and likeness compensation and could earn more with additional eligibility. Representing themselves and a certified class of similarly situated athletes, they challenged only the NCAA’s decision not to apply the new rule retroactively, not the rule as a whole. They alleged an unreasonable restraint under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, as well as contract and declaratory-judgment claims not at issue in this appeal.
The District of Colorado granted a preliminary injunction benefiting the plaintiffs and the class, requiring a fifth season of eligibility. It accepted sports economist Dr. David Berri’s proposed labor market—“Division I athletics in the United States”—and found the preliminary-injunction requirements satisfied. The NCAA appealed and obtained a stay from the Tenth Circuit, which expedited the appeal because some 2026–27 seasons had begun. The class-certification order was not before the court.
The Court’s Holding
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the Tenth Circuit reversed the order granting the injunction and vacated the injunction. Judge McHugh wrote for the panel. The parties agreed that the rule of reason governed. That analysis begins by defining the relevant market so the defendant’s ability to harm competition can be assessed. The court reviewed the market definition for clear error because it is a factual finding, and held that the district court clearly erred by accepting an undifferentiated national market encompassing all Division I athletics.
In an alleged labor monopsony, the relevant market consists of employers that workers regard as reasonably good substitutes. The NCAA’s central organization does not itself hire athletes to compete for it; the relevant employers are individual athletic programs within member universities. Athletes seek positions with teams in their own sports, not interchangeable positions throughout Division I. The court illustrated the point with football players and schools without football teams, female gymnasts and schools without women’s gymnastics, and basketball, hockey, volleyball, and lacrosse athletes who do not sell their labor across sports. A properly defined market likely would include multiple universities with Division I programs in the athlete’s sport, but not every Division I program nationwide.
Dr. Berri’s evidence concerning selected men’s sports and professional-league alternatives did not establish that all athletes and programs were interchangeable. His reply characterization of individual sports as NCAA-controlled “submarkets” did not cure the defect. Under Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), a relevant submarket requires its own economically supported analysis; it does not inherit the analysis of a broader market. The plaintiffs had neither pleaded nor defined submarkets in their injunction motion, and Berri supplied no data for most Division I sports. The court distinguished United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970), which concerned an improper focus on a submarket instead of the economically significant broader market.
Key Takeaways
- The injunction was vacated because the plaintiffs’ all-Division-I labor market lacked evidentiary support and was implausible, defeating their showing of likely success at the rule of reason’s first step.
- The NCAA’s monopsony power cannot substitute for identifying employers that athletes actually view as reasonably good substitutes.
- The court did not decide anticompetitive effects, procompetitive justifications, less restrictive alternatives, whether antitrust law applies to NCAA eligibility rules at all, or whether a heightened standard for status-quo-altering injunctions applied.
- The ruling addressed the retroactivity challenge and this evidentiary record; it did not hold that sport-specific markets could never be established with appropriate economic evidence.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that NIL compensation and revenue sharing do not eliminate the need for a fact-specific antitrust market analysis. It aligns with recent decisions including Fourqurean v. NCAA, Elad v. NCAA, Robinson v. NCAA, and Blythe v. NCAA in demanding evidence tailored to the asserted athletic labor market.
For athletes seeking eligibility relief, data about a few sports cannot automatically support a nationwide, all-sports market. For the NCAA and its members, however, the decision is not categorical immunity for eligibility rules: the panel expressly left the remaining rule-of-reason issues and the broader applicability of antitrust law unresolved.