Background
Martinez and Merino obtained unsatisfied judgments totaling approximately $103,670 against A Class Limos, LLC and Edward Boginsky in 2020. In June 2021, they filed a motion to commence proceedings supplementary against multiple parties, alleging those parties held property of the judgment debtors. The trial court granted the motion in August 2021 and ordered the defendants to respond within 20 days. In March 2022, Martinez and Merino served a Statement of Particulars identifying specific transfers allegedly made to defraud creditors, including approximately $145,000 in mortgage payments to JP Morgan Chase and vehicle transfers valued at $125,000 to Price for Limo parties.
In August 2024—more than three years after the motion to commence—Martinez and Merino filed three supplemental complaints asserting fraudulent transfer claims under Florida’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Chapter 726). The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the supplemental complaints were time-barred under Chapter 726’s statute of limitations, which generally provides a four-year window for most fraudulent transfer claims. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed all three supplemental complaints with prejudice, citing the statute of limitations and a prior Fourth District decision in McGregor v. Fowler White Burnett, PA.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth District reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the supplemental complaints related back to the June 2021 motion to commence proceedings supplementary under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(c), which permits amendments to relate back when they arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. Critically, the court recognized that although motions are ordinarily not considered “pleadings” under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to commence proceedings supplementary functions as a pleading equivalent because proceedings supplementary are special statutory proceedings governed by section 56.29, which authorizes commencement by motion rather than complaint.
The court applied the three-factor test from Palm Beach County School Board v. Doe, holding that relation back served the liberal policy of resolving cases on the merits, was consistent with the liberal construction of the relation back doctrine, and did not undermine the statute of limitations’ purpose—since the supplemental complaints arose from the same conduct and transfers identified in the original motion and Statement of Particulars. The court distinguished McGregor, where proceedings had been commenced a decade after the transfers and more than three years after discovery, whereas here the original motion had been timely filed within a reasonable timeframe.
Key Takeaways
- In proceedings supplementary, a motion to commence functions as a “pleading” for relation back purposes, allowing subsequent supplemental complaints to relate back to the original motion date.
- Supplemental complaints alleging fraudulent transfers are deemed brought on the date of the motion to commence, not the date of filing the supplemental complaint, if they arise from the same conduct and transfers.
- The relation back doctrine is applied liberally in this context to allow cases to be resolved on the merits without prejudicing defendants who had notice of the claims through the original motion and Statement of Particulars.
- The Fourth District declined to reconsider McGregor, leaving unresolved the broader question of whether fraudulent transfer remedies in proceedings supplementary are governed by Chapter 726’s limitations periods or extend for the life of the judgment.
Why It Matters
This decision provides important guidance for judgment creditors pursuing fraudulent transfer claims in proceedings supplementary. By holding that supplemental complaints relate back to the motion to commence, the court affords creditors greater flexibility in timing and allows them to conduct additional investigation before filing formal fraud allegations. This is particularly significant because it permits supplemental complaints filed years after the initial motion, provided they allege the same underlying transfers and conduct.
The opinion also highlights an unresolved conflict between Florida’s appellate districts. The Fourth District’s approach conflicts with the Third District’s decision in Rosenberg v. U.S. Bank, N.A., which held that fraudulent transfer remedies extend for the life of the judgment rather than being subject to Chapter 726’s shorter limitations periods. The Eleventh Circuit has certified multiple questions regarding section 56.29’s proper interpretation to the Florida Supreme Court, which is currently pending resolution and will likely settle this dispute.