Background
Phillip Miller, employed as a port security officer by Weiser Security Services, Inc., sued for employment discrimination. Weiser moved to compel arbitration of the dispute pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties’ employment agreement. The arbitration clause was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 2).
Miller opposed the motion to compel, arguing that as a port security worker, he fell within the FAA’s exemption for transportation workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. See 9 U.S.C. § 1. Miller submitted a declaration describing his job responsibilities at the port. The trial court granted Weiser’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that Miller’s declaration failed to establish a sufficiently direct, necessary, and active role in transporting goods in interstate commerce.
The Court’s Holding
The Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Miller failed to qualify for the transportation worker exemption under FAA § 1. Under binding Supreme Court precedent, including Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022), Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024), and Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock (2026), a worker seeking to invoke the exemption “must at least play a direct and ‘necessary role in the free flow of goods'” across borders and be actively “engaged in transportation” of those goods via foreign or interstate commerce.
The court affirmed that the burden rests on the party opposing arbitration to demonstrate that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies. Miller could not satisfy this burden because his role as a port security officer—while located at a transportation facility—does not constitute an active role in transporting goods across interstate commerce. The court emphasized that the exemption requires a direct, necessary, and active involvement in the physical movement of goods, not merely working at a port facility.
Key Takeaways
- Port security officers and other transportation-adjacent workers do not automatically qualify for the FAA’s transportation worker exemption merely by virtue of their workplace location.
- The exemption applies only to workers who play a direct, necessary, and active role in moving goods across borders—not to ancillary or support roles at transportation hubs.
- The burden of proving entitlement to the exemption falls on the party opposing arbitration; failure to meet this burden results in enforcement of arbitration agreements.
- Recent Supreme Court decisions establish a consistent, narrow interpretation of “engaged in transportation” under FAA § 1.
Why It Matters
This decision has significant implications for port workers, security personnel, and others employed in transportation-related roles. Many employers in the transportation and logistics sectors include arbitration clauses in employment agreements. Miller clarifies that proximity to interstate commerce or transportation infrastructure does not confer exemption from arbitration—only direct involvement in moving goods across borders qualifies. This increases the likelihood that employment discrimination claims brought by security, administrative, and support personnel at ports and transportation facilities will be subject to mandatory arbitration rather than judicial resolution.
The court’s reliance on consistent Supreme Court precedent signals that this interpretation of the transportation worker exemption is settled law in the federal system, limiting the scope of litigation available to workers seeking to challenge the enforceability of arbitration clauses on the basis of their industry or workplace.