Background
Rachel Shinault violated the conditions of her probation by repeatedly using drugs and failing to remain in drug treatment. The trial court revoked her probation and sentenced her to two years in prison with credit for time served, designating her as a Violent Felony Offender of Special Concern (VFOSC) based on her prior conviction for aggravated assault.
Shinault appealed on two grounds: (1) the trial court improperly designated her as a VFOSC without jury findings, violating the Sixth Amendment under *Erlinger v. United States*, 602 U.S. 821 (2024); and (2) the trial court failed to make written findings on whether she posed a danger to the community, as required by Florida Statutes § 948.06(8)(e).
The Court’s Holding
The First District affirmed the sentence on both counts. First, regarding the VFOSC designation, the court held that Shinault failed to preserve the *Erlinger* claim because rule 3.800(b), Fla. R. Crim. P., applies only to errors in sentence-related orders, not errors in the sentencing process itself. The court receded from prior precedent allowing *Apprendi* claims to be raised under rule 3.800(b), reasoning that jury-findings requirements constitute procedural protections, not substantive sentencing errors. Additionally, even if preserved, jury findings were not required for VFOSC designation in probation revocation proceedings.
Second, the court acknowledged that the trial court was statutorily required to make written findings on dangerousness but held the omission was harmless error. The court reasoned that section 948.06(8)(e) uses those findings only to determine whether probation revocation is mandatory (if danger is found) or discretionary (if no danger is found). Because the trial court revoked probation and imposed a prison sentence regardless, the absence of findings could not have affected the outcome. The court disagreed with prior district court precedent, particularly *Barber v. State*, 207 So. 3d 379 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), which routinely remanded for the required findings.
Key Takeaways
- Jury-findings claims under *Erlinger* are procedural errors not reviewable under rule 3.800(b), and are not cognizable in subsequent motions attacking the probation revocation.
- A trial court’s failure to make written dangerousness findings under § 948.06(8)(e) is harmless when the court revokes probation and imposes prison regardless of the finding’s outcome.
- Harmless error analysis applies to procedural sentencing errors; the error must not have a reasonable possibility of affecting the sentence to be harmless.
- Justice Winokur’s concurrence argues the error was not “adverse” to Shinault at all—a threshold concept distinct from harmless error—since she could not have received a more lenient sentence with or without the dangerousness finding.
Why It Matters
This decision marks a significant shift in Florida appellate practice. Prior district courts, especially the Fifth District in *Barber*, routinely reversed sentences to remand for compliance with the mandatory written-findings requirement, regardless of whether the omission could affect the outcome. This court holds that such remands are unnecessary when the sentence imposed—prison—would result regardless of whether a dangerousness finding exists. The decision applies harmless error analysis, placing the burden on the State to show no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the sentence.
The opinion also reflects evolving doctrine on *Apprendi*/*Erlinger* claims in the post-*Maye v. State* era. By holding that such claims are procedural rather than substantive sentencing errors, and therefore not cognizable under rule 3.800(b), the court effectively narrows appellate pathways for challenging VFOSC designations in probation revocation contexts. Practitioners should note the distinction between the majority’s harmless-error approach and Justice Winokur’s “adverseness” threshold, which may influence future frivolous-appeal analysis in Florida criminal appeals.