Background
Scott Stewart filed for dissolution of his marriage to Mishelle Perdomo in 2018. The court entered an uncontested dissolution judgment nine months later but reserved ruling on equitable distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees. Those contested issues were not resolved until 2022, when the trial court supplemented its judgment, valuing marital property as of the date of the original dissolution petition. Perdomo had requested prejudgment interest on her share of assets for the period between the filing of the petition and the eventual distribution of marital property. The trial court denied the request, finding it would be inequitable to charge the former husband for delays largely attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Perdomo appealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed on several grounds, including the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest, finding the stated basis lacked evidentiary support. The Third District acknowledged tension with Iarussi v. Iarussi, 353 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), in which the First District had held that trial courts categorically lack authority to award prejudgment interest in equitable distribution proceedings. Stewart sought Florida Supreme Court review, creating the direct conflict that gave the court jurisdiction.
The split between the district courts turned on two questions: whether section 61.075, Florida Statutes, affords statutory authority for prejudgment interest awards, and whether this Court’s “loss theory” of prejudgment interest from Argonaut Insurance Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985), is compatible with the equitable-distribution framework. The First District had answered both questions in the negative; the Third District and the majority of other district courts had permitted such awards.
The Court’s Holding
The Florida Supreme Court, in a 5-1 decision authored by Justice Grosshans, held that trial courts have discretionary statutory authority under section 61.075 to award prejudgment interest as part of an equitable distribution of marital property. The Court approved the Third District’s decision and disapproved Iarussi to the extent it held otherwise. The Court grounded its holding in section 61.075(1)’s express provision that its enumerated rules apply “in addition to all other remedies available to a court to do equity between the parties,” concluding that prejudgment interest qualifies as one such remedy given the statute’s pervasive equity-based framework.
The Court rejected both rationales offered by the First District. First, it found the negative-implication canon inapplicable: the statute’s postjudgment interest provision—which authorizes interest on installment payments after judgment—addresses only a narrow, discrete issue and cannot be read as an exhaustive statement of all interest-related authority. Second, it held that the Argonaut “loss theory” is not incompatible with equitable distribution proceedings, because the goal of making a party whole aligns with the statute’s equity objectives, and because one spouse may, as a practical matter, be deprived of access to jointly owned marital assets during prolonged dissolution proceedings.
Critically, the Court emphasized that prejudgment interest is not automatic. A party has no entitlement to it; the award is discretionary and requires factual justification—for example, where a spouse is deprived of significant marital assets during the pendency of the case. On remand, the trial court was directed to reconsider whether the facts support an award of prejudgment interest and, if so, whether granting it would be an appropriate means of achieving equity between the parties.
Key Takeaways
- Trial courts in Florida now have confirmed discretionary authority to award prejudgment interest in marital dissolution proceedings under section 61.075’s broad equitable-remedy clause.
- Prejudgment interest is not an entitlement; a party must demonstrate factual circumstances justifying the award—such as one spouse being deprived of access to or use of marital assets during a prolonged dissolution.
- The negative-implication canon does not bar prejudgment interest simply because the statute expressly authorizes postjudgment interest on installment payments; the two provisions serve distinct functions.
- Iarussi v. Iarussi, 353 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), is disapproved to the extent it held that prejudgment interest is categorically unavailable in equitable distribution cases.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves a longstanding conflict among Florida’s district courts and establishes, for the first time, that Florida’s highest court recognizes prejudgment interest as a legitimate tool in equitable distribution. For practitioners, this means that in cases involving prolonged dissolution proceedings—particularly where one spouse controls or exclusively benefits from marital assets pending final judgment—a claim for prejudgment interest is now squarely on the table. Trial courts will need to make specific factual findings both to justify the award and to support any decision to deny it, as the Third District’s reversal of the trial court in this very case illustrates.
The decision also has broader doctrinal significance: the Court’s analysis reinforces Florida’s expansive view of trial court equitable authority in dissolution proceedings and cautions against mechanical application of the negative-implication canon where a statutory provision serves a narrow purpose. Justice Labarga’s dissent, which would have confined interest awards to the postjudgment context expressly addressed by the Legislature, signals that the scope of implied equitable remedies in statutory frameworks will likely remain a contested interpretive question in Florida courts.