Background
The Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit issued Administrative Order 2026-03 on February 18, 2026, establishing a registry of court-appointed expert witnesses and setting compensation rates. The order distinguished between payment for written evaluations (which the court funds) and payment for testimony at hearings (which the subpoenaing party funds unless the presiding judge independently determines the testimony is necessary). Jessica J. Yeary, the Public Defender for the circuit, filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking to quash the order, arguing it conflicted with section 916.115, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212, and violated the separation of powers.
The Public Defender did not identify any specific pending case or client affected by the order, but challenged it as a matter of circuit-wide policy.
The Court’s Holding
The First District Court of Appeal dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that certiorari is not available to review administrative orders of this character. The court grounded its decision in the ancient common law origins and historical purpose of certiorari—a writ designed to review the proceedings of lower tribunals in judicial or quasi-judicial matters, not to challenge administrative policy directives.
The court concluded that the administrative order lacked the hallmarks of judicial or quasi-judicial action: it did not adjudicate a dispute, resolve factual or legal questions about a particular defendant, or arise from a pending case. Rather, it prescribes prospective policy about who bears financial responsibility for expert witness testimony—quintessentially an administrative or quasi-legislative act. Because the order was issued pursuant to the chief judge’s general administrative authority under Rule 2.215 and required no prior notice, adversarial hearing, or evidentiary record, it falls outside certiorari’s scope.
The court rejected the argument that the 2025 amendment to Rule 2.215(e)(2)—which permits challenges to administrative orders “by petition for an extraordinary writ”—expands district court jurisdiction. The court held that procedural rules cannot alter constitutional limits on subject matter jurisdiction, which is fixed by Article V of the Florida Constitution and longstanding precedent. Supervision of chief judges in their administrative capacity rests exclusively with the chief justice of the Florida Supreme Court, not the district courts.
Key Takeaways
- Certiorari historically and constitutionally lies only to review judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings of lower tribunals, not administrative policy orders
- An administrative order establishing circuit-wide prospective policy is not reviewable by certiorari, even if challenged through proper procedure
- A rule of procedure cannot expand the constitutional subject matter jurisdiction of the courts; the 2025 Rule 2.215(e)(2) amendment does not authorize certiorari review of administrative orders
- The proper forum for challenging a chief judge’s authority to issue an administrative order is the Florida Supreme Court; alternatively, the order may be challenged within a specific pending case affecting a particular litigant
Why It Matters
This decision provides important clarification about the scope of extraordinary writs in Florida. By grounding its analysis in the historical origins of certiorari (dating to 12th-century England and adopted as Florida law in 1829), the court reasserts that the writ serves a narrow, defined purpose: reviewing adjudicatory proceedings of inferior tribunals, not scrutinizing administrative policymaking. The opinion signals that parties challenging circuit-wide administrative policies must either petition the Florida Supreme Court directly or wait to challenge the policy’s application in a specific pending proceeding, not seek review in the district courts.
The decision has practical significance for public defenders, prosecutors, and other court actors who may disagree with chief judges’ administrative directives. It establishes that broad policy challenges require a different forum than case-specific challenges. The court certified conflict with Holt v. Chief Judge of Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), which had asserted certiorari jurisdiction over a freestanding challenge to an administrative order without requiring a pending proceeding, indicating continued uncertainty in this area among Florida’s appellate courts.