Background
Ruby Medders sued Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. in September 2022 for injuries to her knee and ankle following a November 2020 slip-and-fall at a Valdosta store. At a January 2026 jury trial, Medders asserted that pre-existing knee issues intensified after the fall and required surgery, while Wal-Mart maintained the injury was pre-existing and unrelated to the incident. During cross-examination of Wal-Mart’s expert, Medders highlighted the physician’s expert witness fees of $2,000 per hour and $8,000 per trial day.
During closing argument, Medders’ counsel addressed the formulation of noneconomic damages for pain and suffering by referencing the defense expert’s fees, suggesting the expert would have charged $8,000 for a full day in court and equating the per diem fee to three million dollars annually. Wal-Mart objected, arguing the references were not rationally related to evidence of noneconomic damages under Georgia’s 2025 tort reform legislation. The trial court, while concerned, concluded the argument was permissible because the expert’s rates were part of the evidence presented at trial. Medders’ counsel then pivoted to suggesting the jury calculate damages at an hourly rate closer to minimum wage, between $7.25 and $12.15 per hour. Wal-Mart moved for a mistrial or, alternatively, a curative instruction; both requests were denied. The jury returned a general verdict awarding Medders $975,000, and the trial court entered judgment on that verdict.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals, reviewing the legal question de novo, held that portions of Medders’ closing argument were improper under OCGA § 9-10-184(c)(1), as amended effective April 21, 2025. The court explained that the revised statute permits argument on the worth or monetary value of noneconomic damages only after the close of evidence and requires that such argument be rationally related to the evidence of noneconomic damages, prohibiting reference to objects or values having no rational connection to the facts proved. Under the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that the arguments concerning the defense expert’s fees and minimum wage rates were improper because they lacked a rational connection to Medders’ noneconomic damages.
The court rejected Medders’ argument that the issue concerned OCGA § 24-4-403 (Rule 403), explaining that Rule 403 concerns whether evidence is admissible in the first instance, while OCGA § 9-10-184(c)(1) concerns how the evidence adduced at trial may be presented to the jury in a closing argument; Rule 403 requires weighing the value of potential evidence for admissibility, while OCGA § 9-10-184(c)(1) demands an evaluation of the relationship between admitted evidence and closing argument. However, the court expressly disagreed with Wal-Mart’s broader contention that the statute prohibits all “unit value” or “per diem” arguments, holding that such arguments concern the manner of formulating or calculating damages and remain permissible under the plain language of the statute.
Because the trial court failed to recognize that the argument ran afoul of OCGA § 9-10-184(c), it did not take remedial measures as required by OCGA § 9-10-185. The court held that when a litigant’s closing argument is improper and the trial court overrules objection and fails to take corrective action, reversal is required if the uncorrected improper argument could have affected the jury’s verdict. Given that Medders sought only $186,000 in medical bills but asked for approximately $950,000 in noneconomic damages based on the improper arguments, and the jury returned a verdict for $975,000, the court had little trouble concluding that the uncorrected improper argument could have affected the verdict. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Key Takeaways
- Under the evidence presented at trial, comparisons of noneconomic damages to the defense expert’s fees and minimum-wage rates violated OCGA § 9-10-184(c)(1).
- OCGA § 9-10-184(c)(1) does not prohibit unit-value or per diem arguments concerning the manner of formulating or calculating noneconomic damages.
- Rule 403 addresses the admissibility of evidence, whereas OCGA § 9-10-184(c)(1) addresses the relationship between admitted evidence and closing argument.
- The judgment was reversed because the uncorrected improper argument could have affected the jury’s verdict, not solely because the trial court denied the mistrial or curative-instruction requests.
Why It Matters
This decision interprets Georgia’s 2025 tort reform legislation governing closing arguments on noneconomic damages, clarifying that while attorneys may argue the worth or value of such damages, references to unrelated values—such as expert witness fees or minimum wage rates—are improper if they lack rational connection to the evidence of noneconomic damages. The ruling distinguishes between the admissibility of evidence under Rule 403 and the permissible use of that evidence in closing argument under OCGA § 9-10-184(c)(1), emphasizing that even admitted evidence cannot be used to assign value to noneconomic damages through irrational comparisons.
The decision also preserves the longstanding practice of unit-value or per diem arguments for calculating pain and suffering, rejecting the defense’s invitation to prohibit such methodologies entirely. Trial courts must now carefully evaluate whether closing arguments referencing specific dollar values or rates are rationally related to the evidence of noneconomic damages, and failure to sustain objections and provide curative instructions when such arguments are improper may result in reversal if the uncorrected argument could have affected the verdict.