Capital One v. Tibunsay — Appeal dismissed for failure to file opening brief

Case
Capital One, N.A. v. Ashley C. Tibunsay
Court
Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Judge
Karen T. Nakasone (David Y. Ige, 2020); Clyde J. Wadsworth (David Y. Ige, 2019)
Date Decided
June 23, 2026
Docket No.
CAAP-25-0000554
Topics
Appellate Procedure, Default, Dismissal, Pro Se Litigants
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Capital One, N.A. sued Ashley C. Tibunsay in the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division (Case No. 1DRC-22-0007775). Tibunsay, representing herself, filed a notice of appeal on August 7, 2025, seeking review of the district court’s ruling in Capital One’s favor.

Under the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure, Tibunsay was required to file a statement of jurisdiction by October 3, 2025, and an opening brief by January 6, 2026. She failed to file either document and did not request any extension of time. On January 14, 2026, the appellate clerk entered a default notice — served electronically on Tibunsay — warning that the appeal could be dismissed under HRAP Rules 12.1(e) and 30, and advising her that she could seek relief from default by motion. Tibunsay took no corrective action.

Capital One moved to dismiss the appeal on May 5, 2026. Tibunsay filed no opposition.

The Court’s Holding

The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals, per Chief Judge Nakasone and Associate Judges Wadsworth and Gluck, granted Capital One’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The court grounded its ruling in Tibunsay’s complete failure to prosecute: she missed both the statement-of-jurisdiction and opening-brief deadlines, ignored the clerk’s formal default notice, and never moved for relief or otherwise responded to the court’s warnings.

Because Tibunsay took no corrective action after receiving notice that dismissal was a likely consequence of her default, the court found no basis to allow the appeal to proceed and exercised its authority under HRAP Rules 12.1(e) and 30 to dismiss.

Key Takeaways

  • An appellant who misses both the statement-of-jurisdiction and opening-brief deadlines, and ignores a formal default notice, faces mandatory dismissal under HRAP Rules 12.1(e) and 30.
  • Electronic service of a default notice is sufficient notice; Tibunsay’s failure to monitor or respond to electronic service did not excuse her default.
  • Pro se status does not relieve a party of the obligation to comply with appellate procedural rules and deadlines.
  • An unopposed motion to dismiss based on the appellant’s default will ordinarily be granted.

Why It Matters

This order is a straightforward reminder that appellate courts enforce their own procedural rules regardless of whether a litigant is represented by counsel. Self-represented appellants must comply with filing deadlines and respond to default notices just as attorneys must; sympathy for pro se litigants does not extend to excusing wholesale abandonment of an appeal.

For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of monitoring opposing appellants’ compliance with briefing schedules and moving promptly to dismiss when defaults go uncured — a low-cost mechanism for securing finality in favor of the appellee.

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