Background
In 2021, Celeste Gonsalves was a tenant renting an accessory dwelling unit from Stuart Glauberman and Vicky Ramil. After Gonsalves refused to vacate, her landlords filed actions for summary possession and damages. The District Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment to the landlords, and Gonsalves appealed. In January 2024, the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Gonsalves exhausted further review — reconsideration in the ICA was denied, certiorari in the Hawaii Supreme Court was denied, and certiorari in the United States Supreme Court was denied in 2025.
Undeterred, Gonsalves returned to the District Court in June 2025 and filed a motion to vacate the judgment under HRCP Rule 60(b)(4), which permits relief from a void judgment. She argued that the 2021 eviction violated mandatory federal HUD regulations under the Section 8 program, that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction, and that she was denied due process. The District Court denied the motion in July 2025 and denied her subsequent motion for reconsideration in August 2025. Gonsalves appealed both rulings to the ICA.
The Court’s Holding
The ICA affirmed both the denial of the Rule 60(b)(4) motion and the denial of reconsideration. The court held that neither condition for voiding a judgment was present. On jurisdiction, the court explained that Gonsalves was not challenging the District Court’s authority to hear landlord-tenant disputes or to adjudicate the parties before it — she was arguing only that the court misapplied or ignored federal law. That is an argument that the court erred, not that it lacked jurisdiction, and it is not a cognizable basis for Rule 60(b)(4) relief under the narrowly construed void-judgment doctrine.
On due process, the court similarly found that Gonsalves had been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims. She had in fact raised Section 8 federal law arguments during the 2021 summary judgment proceedings. The court reiterated that it is the denial of an opportunity to be heard that renders a judgment void — not a disagreement with the court’s ultimate ruling. Because Gonsalves was seeking to relitigate the merits of the same eviction that had been upheld through multiple levels of appellate review, the ICA found no cognizable basis for post-judgment relief.
Key Takeaways
- A Rule 60(b)(4) void-judgment challenge requires showing the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties, or acted inconsistent with due process — arguing the court misapplied substantive law does not suffice.
- A tenant’s full opportunity to raise federal housing law arguments during original proceedings forecloses a later due-process-based void-judgment claim on those same grounds.
- Hawaii courts apply the void-judgment concept narrowly in the interest of finality; a judgment that may be wrong on the merits is not the same as a void judgment.
- Exhaustion of direct appellate review — including certiorari denials in both the Hawaii Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court — does not reopen the door to collateral attack via Rule 60(b)(4) absent a true jurisdictional defect.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the limited scope of Hawaii’s void-judgment doctrine and the high bar tenants (or any litigants) face when attempting to unwind a final judgment through post-judgment motion practice after direct appeals have been exhausted. Courts have strong interest in the finality of judgments, and this case illustrates that repackaging a merits argument as a jurisdictional or due-process challenge will not satisfy Rule 60(b)(4).
For landlord-tenant practitioners, the case is a reminder that arguments based on federal housing regulations — including HUD and Section 8 rules — must be raised and pressed during the original proceedings. Failure to prevail on those arguments at the trial and appellate level will not, on its own, support a subsequent claim that the judgment is void for violating federal law.